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Brands, Competition, and the Law
Deven R. Desai and Spencer Waller
Brands matter. In modern times, brands and brand management
have become a central feature of the modern economy and a staple of
business theory and business practice. Coca-Cola, Nike, Google, Disney,
Apple, Microsoft, BMW, Marlboro, IBM, Kellogg’s, Gucci, and Virgin
are all large companies, but they are also brands that present powerful,
valuable tools for business. Business is fully aware of that power and
value. Contrary to the law’s conception of trademarks, brands are used
to indicate far more than source and/or quality. Indeed those functions
are far down on the list of what most businesses want for their brands.
Brands allow businesses to reach consumers directly with messages
regarding emotion, identity, and self-worth, such that consumers are no
longer buying a product but buying a brand. Businesses pursue this
strategy to move beyond price, product, place, and position and create
the idea that a consumer should buy a branded good or service at a
higher price than the consumer might otherwise pay. Branding explicitly
contemplates reducing or eliminating price competition, as the brand
personality cannot be duplicated. In addition, this practice can be
understood as a product differentiation tactic that allows a branded
good to turn a commodity into a special category that sees higher
margins compared to the others in that market space. In sum, brands
have important effects on competition and the marketplace.
Given that both trademark law and antitrust law address business
competition, one might expect them to address brands as they fit into
each doctrine’s areas of concern and that together trademark and
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antitrust law would offer a coherent legal regime to manage the way in
which brands affect competition. That, however, is not the case.
In this Article Professors Desai and Waller begin the process of
broadening the legal understanding of brands by explaining what
brands are and how they function, how trademark and antitrust law
have misunderstood brands, and the implications of continuing to
ignore the role brands play in business competition. They conclude that
branding is so central to the business world, the modern economy, and
the law that legal discourse must understand brands or it will continue
to reach incoherent results as it tries to navigate the realities of business
competition in the twenty-first century.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Brands matter. In modern times, brands and brand management
have become a central feature of the modern economy and a staple
of business theory and business practice. Coca-Cola, Nike, Google,
Disney, Apple, Microsoft, BMW, Marlboro, IBM, Kellogg’s, Gucci,
and Virgin are all large companies, but they are also brands that
present powerful, valuable tools for business. Business is fully aware
of that power and value.1 Contrary to the law’s conception of
trademarks, brands are used to indicate far more than source and/or
quality. Indeed those functions are far down on the list of what most
businesses want for their brands. Brands allow businesses to reach
consumers directly with messages regarding emotion, identity, and
self-worth, such that consumers are no longer buying a product but
buying a brand. Businesses pursue this strategy to move beyond
price, product, place, and position and create the idea that a
consumer should buy a branded good or service at a higher price
than the consumer might otherwise pay. Branding explicitly
contemplates reducing or eliminating price competition, as the brand
personality cannot be duplicated. In addition, this practice can be
understood as a product differentiation tactic that allows a branded
1. See, e.g., Bloomberg, Top 100 Global Brands Scoreboard, BUSINESSWEEK.COM
(August 6, 2007) http://bwnt.businessweek.com/interactive_reports/top_brands/index.asp
(listing Coca-Cola as the number one brand with a $65 billion value and Hertz as the number
one hundred brand with a value of $3 billion); MILLWARD BROWN OPTIMOR, BRANDZ TOP
100 MOST VALUABLE GLOBAL BRANDS (2009), available at http://www.brandz.com/
upload/brandz-report-2009-complete-report(1).pdf. Brand valuation is a contested area, yet
regardless of the method used to calculate the value, all agree that brands can be worth a large
amount. Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1794–95 (2007) (noting different brand valuation methods).
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good to turn a commodity into a special category that sees higher
margins compared to the others in that market space. In sum, brands
have important effects on competition and the marketplace.
Given that both trademark law and antitrust law address business
competition, one might expect them to address brands as they fit
into each doctrine’s areas of concern and that together trademark
and antitrust law would offer a coherent legal regime to manage the
way in which brands affect competition. That, however, is not the
case. This Article begins the process of broadening the legal
understanding of brands by explaining what brands are and how they
function, how trademark and antitrust law have misunderstood
brands, and the implications of continuing to ignore the role brands
play in business competition.
To some extent, both trademark and antitrust law’s myopia stem
from the same cause. Over the past thirty years, both bodies of law
have relied heavily on neo-classical price theory to define legal rules
that promote efficiency as the key to understanding competition. In
many cases, this approach is a useful and powerful tool to understand
and manage competition as it relates to price. But such a focus
misses (and often assumes away) the role that brands play as
businesses seek to maximize profits in ways that may be inefficient.
In short, businesses and business literature explicitly acknowledge
that brands are used to compete on dimensions other than price.2
From a business point of view, brands are levers that permit
companies to differentiate their products and services, price
discriminate, and increase customer loyalty to the point where price
theory no longer explains well what brands (if any) consumers view
as substitutes, when confusion does or does not arise in the
marketplace, and how consumers choose between brands and
between dealers for the same brands.3
In simplest terms, trademark law fails to recognize that
trademarks are only a subset of businesses’ broader brand strategy in
the real world. The dominant theoretical approach is the search cost
theory of trademarks, which holds that a trademark should function
4
as a sign of “consistent source and quality.” Once that occurs,
2. See, e.g., MILLWARD BROWN OPTIMOR, supra note 1, at 8 (noting that brands are
“among a company’s most valuable assets” as they can “ensur[e] higher demand and market
share,” “command[] premium prices and better supplier terms,” and “create differentiation
that allows companies to overcome commoditization”).
3. Id.
4. Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis
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“[r]ather than having to inquire into the provenance and qualities of
every potential purchase, consumers can look to trademarks as
shorthand indicators. Because information is less expensive,
consumers will demand more of it and will arguably become better
informed, resulting in a more competitive market.”5 As Barton
Beebe has observed, this view has been “a totalizing and, for many,
quite definitive theory of American trademark law.”6
A successful brand, however, encompasses far more than merely
indicating source and quality. Accordingly, trademark law is
incomplete and regulates only a fraction of the relevant business
behavior pertaining to brands. In addition, trademark law has
expanded the subject matter of trademarks and what constitutes
infringement over time. The combined effect is to provide increased
protection for trademarks from products and services that do not
compete or where there is no consumer confusion as to source and
quality.7 As trademark law has provided protection for such
situations, the claimed protection for a mark, first subtly and then
more aggressively, has transformed into protection for a brand.
This dramatic shift took place with little recognition of the
significance of brands and branding. The overall effect was an
important legal change that occurred without debate or recognition
of the elevation of the brand to one of the most protected forms of
legal property and one of the most valuable assets in the
marketplace.8 Neither advocates nor opponents of these changes
appreciated the subtle shift from marks to brands. This blindness led
to unintended (or at least misunderstood) change and one-sided
expansion of the legal regime. In addition, trademark doctrine
looked to antitrust laws to regulate anti-competitive behavior
involving trademarks and related rights.

for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 790 (1997).
5. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the
Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 786–87 (2004); accord Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis
of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (2004).
6. Beebe, supra note 5, at 623.
7. See generally Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm,
95 IOWA L. REV. 63 (2009) (examining how trademark law has grown to protect noncompeting, non-confusing uses and explaining what constitutes harm in those contexts).
8. It is estimated that the top 100 brands in the world are worth, collectively, more
than $2 trillion and increase in value at a rate of approximately 18.5%. MILLWARD BROWN
OPTIMOR, BrandZ Top 100 Most Valuable Global Brands (2010), available at
http://c1547732.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/BrandZ_Top100_2010.pdf.
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Antitrust law as a discipline was, however, in no better position
to understand the shift to a brand-based economy and make a
conscious decision as to the appropriate legal regime. Older cases
identified where trademarks were used as a cover for collusion,9 but
those were easy cases both before and after the rise of the brand.
Ironically, antitrust doctrine explicitly engages with many of the
same issues as brand literature: market definition, market power, and
customer lock-in.
Antitrust doctrine’s emphasis on neo-classical price theory,
however, interfered with the doctrine’s ability to understand and
respond to the rise of the brand as a tool for possibly anticompetitive behaviors such as diminishing the role of price
competition, segmenting market demand, facilitating price
discrimination, and locking in consumers to a favored brand. Two
critical questions remain underdeveloped. First, when do brands
confer meaningful market power? And, second, how should brand
management be integrated into the calculus of existing antitrust
analysis? Yet, like trademark law, antitrust law either fails to ask the
right questions, ignores the non-price aspects of how brands and
branding affect market competition, or defers to trademark law to set
the proper limits of the intellectual property rights in question.
The combined effect of this failure in both trademark law and
antitrust law is a dangerous vacuum that this Article seeks to fill. Part
II sets forth, as a descriptive matter, what brands are and what they
do. In explaining a brand’s functions, the section shows how
business practices from around 1900 to the present have always seen
brands as having dimensions well beyond being marks of origin and
quality.
Part III shifts the analysis to law. We analyze how trademark law
does, or does not, understand brands, and yet nonetheless has
fostered a trademark regime to protect and promote the growth of
national brands. We further demonstrate how several doctrines
related to confusion and the dilution doctrine within trademark law
are better explained as protecting brands rather than protecting
trademarks as symbols of source and quality upon which consumers
rely to make purchasing decisions.
Part IV changes the focus from trademark law to antitrust law. In
this section, we analyze the limited ways that antitrust has sought to
come to grips with competition issues relating to brands. First,
9. See infra note 206.
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antitrust law has focused on narrow notions of trademark rather than
the broader notion of the brand. Second, antitrust has relied on price
theory in defining relevant markets and measuring potential
competitive harms, thus again missing the significance of the role of
the brand. Finally, we argue that antitrust perversely has become the
enabler of brands by simplistically using key concepts such as interbrand competition and intra-brand competition that fly in the face of
the realities of the business world and the current role of the brand.
Part V addresses what would be required for a brand perspective
to take hold in trademark and antitrust law and where such a
perspective could lead those two doctrines. We conclude that
branding is so central to the business world, the modern economy,
and the law that legal discourse must understand brands or it will
continue to reach incoherent results as it tries to navigate the realities
of business competition in the twenty-first century.
II. BRANDS: WHAT THEY ARE AND WHAT THEY DO
Although there is voluminous literature that explores brand
theories, brand strategies, brand meaning, brand components, and
brand functions,10 it is difficult to find a succinct definition of what a
brand is. Marketing expert Sidney Levy’s characterization of a brand
as a complex symbol that incorporates consumers’ motives, feelings,
logic, and attitudes11 captures some major functions of a brand. For
our purposes as legal academics, we will refer to brands as
manufacturers’ or service providers’ coordinated use of design,
packaging, graphics, logos, advertising, promotion, public relations,
marketing, distribution, pricing, communications, and other
strategies to create a durable identity and loyalty with their
consumers. We believe this view fairly synthesizes the mainstream
serious business literature on branding and provides a useful starting
place for the topic that interests us the most—namely, how should
the law account for the importance of brands in the business world?

10. See, e.g., MARK BATEY, BRAND MEANING (2008); BRANDS, CONSUMERS, SYMBOLS,
& RESEARCH: SIDNEY J. LEVY ON MARKETING (Dennis W. Rook ed. 1999); GIEP FRANZEN &
SANDRA MORIARTY, THE SCIENCE AND ART OF BRANDING (2009). In addition to serious
business scholarship, there are literally hundreds of more general books and articles on how to
create a successful brand and case studies of successes and failures in the field.
11. Burleigh B. Gardner & Sidney J. Levy, The Product and the Brand, 33 HARV. BUS.
REV., Mar.–Apr. 1955, at 33.
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Despite the rich business literature on brands and branding, the
question of what is a brand or what makes a brand has received little
attention in legal literature.12 Part of the problem stems from
historical accounts of the development of trademarks, which often
look to early uses of markings on goods as examples, if not the seeds,
of modern trademark usage and law.13 Although many different
ancient and medieval civilizations—from the Indus river valley to
China to several Mediterranean cultures to Nigeria to the Arab
Empire to medieval England—used brands and a variety of other
commercial symbols to indicate ownership14 and facilitate commerce;
none of those uses corresponds to modern brands.15 As economies
12. Cf. McKenna, supra note 7, at 67–68 (noting that trademark theory regarding
confusion has not used “a growing body” of brand related literature to inform trademark
theory’s views).
13. See FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW
RELATING TO TRADE-MARK LAW (1925); Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of
Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265, 265–66 (1975); Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and
Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305 (1979);
Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks–Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 551 (1969);
Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trade-Marks, 9 MICH. L. REV. 29
(1911).
14. See Diamond, supra note 13, at 266–67, 273, 283–85.
15. See Karl Moore & Susan Reid, The Birth of the Brand: 4,000 Years of Branding
History (MPRA, Working Paper No. 10169, 2008), available at http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/10169/ (studying the transition from proto-brands to brands and the features
of these two categories across the Indus River Valley, Shang Chinese, Cyprian, Tyrian, Greek,
and modern civilization); see also WILLIAM HENRY BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
TRADE-MARKS AND ANALOGOUS SUBJECTS, (FIRM-NAMES, BUSINESS-SIGNS, GOOD-WILL,
LABELS, &C.) 11 (1885) (indicating 1200–1300 BCE for the trade between Asia Minor and
India); STANLEY WOLPERT, A NEW HISTORY OF INDIA 225 (2000) (noting that trade was
contract based “with a scheduled and predetermined movement of merchandise, of the
Assyrian type” and seems to have been “partly under state control and partly in the hands of
professional merchants, subject to price-regulating market conditions”); Diamond, supra note
13, at 269, 270–73 (noting Roman quality symbols on bricks and the use of empire marks to
identify that certain eye salves, wines, and cheeses came from a particular source especially the
use of FORTIS as mark for a specific type of lamp). On the use of commercial symbols in
Nigeria see generally Ida Madieha Azmi, Spyros Maniatis & Bankol Sodipo, Distinctive Signs
and Early Markets: Europe, Africa and Islam, in 1 PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY SERIES: THE PREHISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
SYSTEMS 143 (Alison Firth ed. 1997) and John Ohi Asein, Consumer Literacy and Confusing
Similarity of Pictorial Trademarks in Nigeria, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 64, 67 (1994). It is a
mistake to conflate Arab culture with Islam, as Egypt and Tyre are both examples of rich preIslamic traditions, which used commercial symbols. See Amir H. Khoury, Ancient and Islamic
Sources of Intellectual Property Protection in the Middle East: A Focus on Trademarks, 43 IDEA
151, 152 (2003). For an understanding of the link between Islamic law and commercial
symbols see generally Azmi, Maniatis, & Sodipo, supra at 150–56. For a detailed description of
the evolution of the uses of commercial symbols from Medieval to more recent England,
including an explanation of the state-based, liability nature of such symbols, see SCHECHTER,
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grew and centralized under the auspices of a royal, religious, and/or
guild authority, marks were used to regulate industry.16 Unlike
modern trademark systems, where the company decides whether and
what trademark to use, ancient and medieval industries did not
choose to use marks. Instead, the government required these
industries to use marks to allow the government to trace a good to a
specific manufacturer so it could be held accountable for products
that did not meet government-established standards.17
Even in such limited market systems, as trade expanded beyond
local environs and reached far flung areas, marks came to indicate
source and quality. In some specific industry sectors leading up to
the mid-nineteenth century, British law began to recognize the
goodwill value and property-like interests that grew with the use of
liability marks.18 Once an economy moves to a more pure private
market system and moves away from face-to-face transactions, marks
seem, of necessity, to become predominantly symbols of origin and
quality with modern trademark systems using voluntary mechanisms
to fuel the system.19
supra note 13, at 26, 38–121.
16. See, e.g., Moore & Reid, supra note 15, at 7–10, 14–18 (explaining the connection
between religious/state authority symbols and long-distance trade in the Indian and Tyrian
civilizations); SCHECHTER, supra note 13, at 129 (“The slight degree of national economic
significance acquired by trade-marks prior to the middle of the nineteenth century accounts for
much of the tardiness in the growth of modern trade-mark law both in England and in the
United States.”). However, as specific trade items were traded over ever-broader territories,
including international ones, the move and call for better protection of commercial symbols as
indicating origin and embodying goodwill grew. SCHECHTER, supra note 13, at 130–34;
accord Lionel Bentley, The Making of Modern Trademark Law: The Construction of the Legal
Concept of Trade Mark (1860-1880), in TRADEMARKS AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
CRITIQUE 3–4 (2008) (“British trade mark law did not really take anything like its modern
shape until the latter half of the nineteenth century.”).
17. See, e.g., SCHECHTER, supra note 13, at 26, 38–121; Rogers, supra note 13, at 29
(use of symbols as quality control for bricks in Roman Empire).
18. See SCHECHTER, supra note 13, at 122–23.
19. See David Higgins, The Making of Modern Trade Mark Law: The UK, 1860-1914, in
TRADEMARKS AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 42–43 (2008). Paul Duguid’s
work on early branding practices also shows that British and French trademark law and brand
practices can be traced to the beginning of the 1800s. Specifically, the alcohol trade played a
major role in shaping the way marks were used and regulated. See Paul Duguid, French
Connections: The International Propagation of Trademarks in the Nineteenth Century, 10
ENTERPRISE AND SOC’Y 3 (2009) [hereinafter Duguid, French Connections]; Paul Duguid,
Developing the Brand: The Case of Alcohol, 1800-1880, 4 ENTERPRISE AND SOC’Y 405 (2003)
[hereinafter Duguid, Developing the Brand]. Duguid’s analysis seems to fit within the idea that
as trade expanded in various civilizations and economies, use of and reliance on commercial
symbols grew.
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Nonetheless, using marks for the “utilitarian provision of
information regarding origin and quality in order to reduce risk and
uncertainty”20 is only a part of what brands encompass.21 Brands
have “more complex . . . characteristics . . . which are related to
image building and include status/power, inherent value and finally,
the development of brand personality (transformational).”22 As one
study has put it, marks that only convey information and/or offer
only one part of image building are proto-brands.23 Not until the
late nineteenth century did the birth of modern brands occur, where
a private mark provided information regarding source and quality
and simultaneously had image components regarding power, value,
and personality.24
Unlike trademark law, the business literature has moved quickly
to keep pace with the realities of modern branding. Writers in the
early 1980s, such as Kotler, defined the brand in terms roughly
coextensive with the legal definition of a trademark: a “name, term,
symbol, or design, or a combination of them, which is intended to
signify the goods or services of competitors.”25 Even at the start of
the 1990s, marketing theorist David Aaker argued that a brand is “a
distinguishing name and/or symbol (such as a logo, trademark, or
package design) intended to identify the goods or services of either
one seller or a group of sellers, and to differentiate those goods or
services from those of competitors.”26 By the end of the 1990s,
brand theorists had moved well beyond considering brands as only
indicating source and/or guaranteeing quality, and instead explicitly
saw them as encompassing a broader array of functions.
Reid and Moore document the growth of the brand, which
entails a company creating a personality for a brand that a consumer
then incorporates into how he or she “express[es] his or her own
20. Moore & Reid, supra note 15, at 25.
21. See, e.g., Susan Fournier, Consumers and Their Brands: Developing Relationship
Theory in Consumer Research, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 343, 344 (1998) (challenging the way in
which brand theory often reduces to utilitarian views); Ariel Katz, Beyond Search Costs: The
Linguistic and Trust Functions of Trademarks, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1555, 1564 (noting that
pure utilitarian views of trademark functions are “naïve” and fail to capture the persuasive
branding aspect of trademarks).
22. Moore & Reid, supra note 15, at 25.
23. Id. at 26.
24. Id. at 24–26.
25. PHILIP
KOTLER,
MARKETING
MANAGEMENT,
ANALYSIS,
PLANNING,
IMPLEMENTATION, AND CONTROL 482 (5th ed. 1984).
26. DAVID AAKER, MANAGING BRAND EQUITY 7 (1991).
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self, an ideal self, or specific dimensions of the self.”27 Other
marketing literature emphasizes the way a brand allows product
differentiation, impacts consumer preferences, and enables crosscultural marketing.28 Recent work has described a brand as a
promise,29 a relationship between company and consumer,30 and
even having a soul.31 In short, brands are far more than trademarks.
27. Moore & Reid, supra note 15, at 24 (citations and internal quotations omitted);
accord MARCEL DANESI, BRANDS 33 (2006); MARK BATEY, BRAND MEANING (2008).
28. Moore & Reid, supra note 15, at 24 (citations omitted); see also DAVID ARNOLD,
THE HANDBOOK OF BRAND MANAGEMENT 2 (2002) (“Today’s great brands are personalities
. . . branding, therefore, has to do with the way customers perceive and buy things; it is not
simply a characteristic of certain industries.”); MICHELE FIORONI & GARRY TITTERTON,
BRAND STORMING: MANAGING BRANDS IN THE ERA OF COMPLEXITY 32 (2009) (“[A] brand
today can really be thought of as being like a living organism, with an identity and a personality
which the consumers themselves have asked it to take on—perhaps in order to re-appropriate
them later.”); Gardner & Levy, supra note 11.
29. See, e.g., ALLEN P. ADAMSON, BRANDSIMPLE: HOW THE BEST BRANDS KEEP IT
SIMPLE AND SUCCEED 3 (2006) (“[A] brand is something that lives in your head. It’s a
promise that links a product or service to a consumer.”); SCOTT M. DAVIS, BRAND ASSET
MANAGEMENT: DRIVING PROFITABLE GROWTH THROUGH YOUR BRANDS 3 (2002) (“[A]
brand is a set of promises. It implies trust, consistency, and a defined set of expectations.”).
Business executives hold similar views. Ed Buckley (VP, UPS) and Matt Williams (Senior VP,
Marti Agency) agree that “at its most basic level, a brand is simply a promise a company makes
to the market.” Ed Buckley & Matt Williams, Internal Branding, in KELLOGG ON BRANDING:
THE MARKETING FACULTY OF THE KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 320 (Alice M.
Tybout & Tim Calkins eds., 2005).
30. See, e.g., Scott Davis, Building a Brand-Driven Organization, in KELLOGG ON
BRANDING: THE MARKETING FACULTY OF THE KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 226
(Alice M. Tybout & Tim Calkins eds., 2005) (“[A brand is] about the relationship forged
between an entity and its products and services—represented by the brand—and consumers.”);
FIORONI & TITTERTON, supra note 28, at 48 (“[A]ccording to a simplified definition, a brand
represents the relationship which is established between the consumer and the company.”);
LIZ MOOR, THE RISE OF BRANDS 6 (2007) (internal quotations omitted) (describing brands
as an “ongoing relationship between consumers and businesses”); John F. Sherry, Jr., Brand
Meaning, in KELLOGG ON BRANDING: THE MARKETING FACULTY OF THE KELLOGG SCHOOL
OF MANAGEMENT 41 (Alice M. Tybout & Tim Calkins eds., 2005) (“A brand is a contract, a
relationship, a guarantee; an elastic covenant with loose rules of engagement . . . .”). Even
business leaders concur with this definition. According to Sumner Redstone, chairman and
CEO of Viacom, a brand is “‘a special relationship that you develop with a particular audience
where they trust what you’re doing and you trust them.’” MICHAEL LEVINE, A BRANDED
WORLD: ADVENTURES IN PUBLIC RELATIONS AND THE CREATION OF SUPERBRANDS 194
(2003).
31. See, e.g., CORPORATE CULTURES AND GLOBAL BRANDS 2 (Albrecht Rothacher ed.,
2004) (“Simply put, a brand is the soul of a product. It facilitates consumer choice as it
represents reliable qualities, images and pricing.”); John F. Sherry, Jr., Brand Meaning, in
KELLOGG ON BRANDING: THE MARKETING FACULTY OF THE KELLOGG SCHOOL OF
MANAGEMENT 41 (Alice M. Tybout & Tim Calkins eds., 2005) (“A brand is a mental shortcut
that discourages rational thought, an infusing with the spirit of the maker, a gathering, an
inspiration. A brand is a semiotic enterprise of the firm, the companion spirit of the firm, a
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This section explains what modern brands are, how they grew, and
their different, related functions.
A. Brands: Much More Than Source and Quality Indicators
Trademark law is quite naïve or at best myopic in how it
accounts for the way in which brands function. Rather than simply
being a vehicle for information regarding source and quality, brands
play multiple, interconnected roles in the construction of the
marketplace. As Celia Lury explains: “The brand is thus a
mechanism—or medium—for the co-construction of supply and
demand. It is not simply an add-on, a mark to identify an origin that
is fixed. Instead, it is an abstract machine for the reconfiguration of
production.”32 No matter what dimension of brand one examines or
accepts, brands have enormous, malleable market power. Companies
understand that potential power and seek to develop and use it to
further their success.
1. How brands drive demand, act as levers of power in supply chains,
and facilitate price control
From the birth of modern branding to today, businesses have
used brands as a way to create demand, extract value from within the
supply chain, and control prices. Early nineteenth century U.S.
markets operated with regional manufacturers using a system of
wholesalers and commissioned merchants.33 These “middlemen”
represented the demand manufacturers aimed to meet for “most
goods were sold as unbranded commodities, and the wholesalers
wielded the power in the system, buying from the producer who
offered white soap or tenpenny [sic] nails at the best price.”34 It was
the wholesalers who both distributed and promoted the products.35
Most importantly, the manufacturers did not mark their goods.36
Instead, the manufacturer sold its production run to the wholesaler
hologram of the firm.”).
32. CELIA LURY, BRANDS: THE LOGOS OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 27 (2004) (citation
omitted); accord MOOR, supra note 30, at 37; Gardner & Levy, supra note 11; Sidney J. Levy
& Dennis W. Rook, Brands, Trademarks, and the Law, in BRANDS, CONSUMERS, SYMBOLS,
supra note 10, at 141.
33. See SUSAN STRASSER, SATISFACTION GUARANTEED: THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN MASS MARKET 18–19 (1989); see also DANESI, supra note 27, at 14.
34. STRASSER, supra note 33, at 19.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 36.
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who moved it along to retailers.37 Retailers then “weighed, blended,
and packaged”38 the goods for consumers including choosing
whether to label goods and, if so, placed the retailer’s name on the
goods.39 Potential purchasers relied on those who ran the stores by
“requesting [products] from the proprietors and clerks who retrieved
goods from the walls of shelving behind the counters at general
stores, groceries, drug stores, and other retail shops.”40 Point-of-sale
institutions also had great power over whether to recommend or
even carry manufacturers’ goods.41
This situation did not last. The late 1800s to early 1900s, the
Industrial Revolution, saw massive shifts in how British and U.S.
society made, distributed, and sold goods. Several events converged
to create a fertile ground for the use of marks by private actors on a
scale and in a manner never before seen or perhaps necessary. The
birth of modern corporations, the legal recognition of intangible
assets such as goodwill, the ability to raise large amounts of capital,
the factory process, the use of rail to ship goods, the rapid
communication possible through telegraph and telephone, and new
methods for packaging goods all intersected to allow for the rise of
national manufacturers that had new opportunities and concerns.42
One issue was that large-scale production could lead to
oversupply problems that were exacerbated by relying on
wholesalers. Those selling food items had to make sure goods
reached markets while still fresh.43 Makers of typewriters, farm
equipment, and sewing machines had to service hundreds of
thousands of new customers.44 The local merchant stood in between
37. Id.
38. LURY, supra note 32, at 18.
39. STRASSER, supra note 33, at 36–37.
40. Id. at 21.
41. Id. Paul Duguid also shows that a similar pattern of production by large
manufacturers, local labeling, and then friction within the supply chain occurred in the alcohol
trades in Britain and France. See Duguid, Developing the Brand, supra note 19, at 411–14.
42. See id. at 23–25; LURY, supra note 32, at 18–19; accord Robert G. Bone, Hunting
Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 576–
77 (2006). Another way of understanding these shifts is the view that brands began to protect
and extract value based on a company’s place in a supply chain. In this view, the betterbranded company reaps larger rewards while the other players operate on thin margins. See
generally Paul Duguid, Brands in Chains, TRADEMARKS, BRANDS, AND COMPETITIVENESS
(2009) (forthcoming).
43. STRASSER, supra note 33.
44. Id.
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the national manufacturer and the consumer and could interfere with
the national retailer’s goals. At almost every turn, national
manufacturers had to overcome the “strong loyalties [customers
had] to the people with whom they did business, which might
surpass their interest in nationally advertised products that they had
not yet tried.”45 Furthermore, local retailers were acutely aware that
national manufacturers were cutting into their profits and often
refused to carry these new goods.46
Enter corporate marks and advertising.47 Large-scale production
altered the locally informed supply and demand system. For example,
Crisco was created because “of a supply consideration in the
cottonseed-oil market[:] [Procter and Gamble] and others attempted
to design consumer demand to meet the needs of production and
company growth.”48 In addition, national manufacturers realized
that “[i]f retailers and wholesalers could purchase Uneeda biscuits or
Ivory soap only from the National Biscuit Company or Procter and
Gamble, they would have to pay the manufacturers’ prices.”49 Both
these concerns intersected perfectly.
Without an obvious demand for a good (be it a new good or a
branded commodity), manufacturers needed to educate consumers
about why their product was the product to buy. Manufacturers had
to convince consumers to buy a nationally made product instead of a
locally labeled product vouched for by a trusted local retailer.
National manufacturers had to use trademarks to educate consumers
about their goods well before marks could take on the additional
roles such as assuring quality and indicating source. For example,
Campbell’s had to inform the public about the “soup idea,” Colgate
had to convince the public they had to use a toothbrush, and Gillette
had to sell the benefits of shaving one’s face every day from home.50
The way in which Procter and Gamble developed and sold
Crisco illustrates a paradigmatic example of the way companies used

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See DANESI, supra note 27, at 8–12 (describing the link between advertising and
branding).
48. STRASSER, supra note 33, at 27.
49. Id. at 19.
50. Id. at 95–97; cf. DANESI, supra note 27, at 14 (explaining how naming a good with
a brand leads to consumers associating an idea such as “ultra-white,” “regal,” and “a good
friend” with specific products).
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marks, advertising, and marketing to sell.51 Procter and Gamble
undertook massive efforts in advertising (traveling cooking schools
to show women why the product was needed, newspaper, street car,
and door-to-door efforts), marketing (using specially designed
containers for railroads), and testing and development (sending
samples to food researchers) to communicate directly with the
consumer and develop the product category of Crisco. 52
This type of advertising was designed, in part, to move beyond a
world where companies made things people wanted to buy to a
world where companies “make people want many other things, in
order to get a big increase in business.”53 Once producers such as
Singer, McCormick, American Tobacco, Procter and Gamble,
National Biscuit Company, and others54 had created consumers who
asked for a product by name, manufacturers (rather than wholesalers
or retailers) could set price: “By advertising branded products,
manufacturers explicitly intended to eliminate price competition and
to eclipse price sensitivity: the consumer who would accept no
substitutes for Ivory soap or Steinway pianos would be unwilling to
settle for another product just because it was cheaper.”55
These practices persist today. For example, Nestlé recently built
its Buitoni brand in much the same way that Procter and Gamble
built Crisco. Nestlé faced a U.K. market where per-capita pasta
consumption was one fourth that in the United States, private label
pasta held 60% of the market, and people simply did not include
pasta in their basic recipe list.56 Just as Procter and Gamble used
customer engagement, event marketing, food study centers, and
more to build and maintain customer bases, many food companies
like Campbell’s, Jello, and Heinz distributed recipes, established a
dedicated cooking school, offered in-store sampling, and held

51. See STRASSER, supra note 33, at 14 (noting that Procter and Gamble’s Crisco
campaign is considered a key moment in advertising and marketing history).
52. Id. at 11–12.
53. Id. at 27; see DANESI, supra note 27, at 17; see also Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks
and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 856–57 (2004) (“Economist John
Kenneth Galbraith famously identified the ‘dependence effect’ of modern systems of
production that are aided and abetted by advertising, whose ‘central function is to create
desires—to bring into being wants that previously did not exist.’” (citation omitted)).
54. See STRASSER, supra note 33, at 30.
55. Id. at 28; accord DANESI, supra note 27, at 1.
56. See STRASSER, supra note 33, at 46.
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numerous factory tours and road shows to allow people to
experience the product.57
These cases reveal another way in which the law must understand
brands better: competition between branded and private label goods.
Unlike the early 1900s where scalable manufacturing power rested
within national manufacturers’ hands, national retailers now use
similar resources to offer high-quality, private-label goods—goods
offered by a retailer under its label rather than a manufacturer’s
branded good58—in an attempt to reclaim a piece of the market.
Given the improved quality of private-label goods, one might
expect that branded goods would suffer greatly. Instead, branded
goods are able to rely on their head start in having a product with
strong brand awareness to maintain their market position59:
Retailers cannot afford to cast off national brands that consumers
expect to find widely distributed; when a store does not carry a
popular brand, consumers are put off and may switch stores.
Retailers must not only stock but also promote, often at a loss,
those popular national brands—such as Miracle Whip, Heinz
ketchup and Campbell’s soup—that consumers use to gauge overall
store prices. Even if, in theory, retailers can make more profit per
unit on private-label products, those products (with rare exceptions
such as President’s Choice chocolate-chip cookies) just do not have
the traffic-building power of brand-name goods.60

Despite the necessity of carrying certain brands even at a loss so
that customers will use a given store, as a general matter, branded
goods are less price elastic than private-label goods.61 A decrease in a
branded good’s price “would swing twice as many sales from private

57. Erich Joachimsthaler & David A. Aaker, Building Brands Without Mass Media, 75
HARV. BUS. REV. 39, 46 (1997) (“[M]ass-media advertising has long been the cornerstone of
most brand-building efforts.”).
58. See John A. Quelch & David Harding, Brands Versus Private Labels: Fighting to
Win, 74 HARV. BUS. REV., 99, 100–02 (1996) (explaining various factors including quality
competition that have allowed for the growth of private labeled goods). See generally PRIVATE
LABELS, BRANDS, AND COMPETITION POLICY: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF RETAIL
COMPETITION (Ariel Ezrachi & Ulf Bernitz eds., 2009); Ariel Ezrachi, Unchallenged Market
Power? The Tale of Supermarkets, Private Labels and Competition Law, 33 WORLD
COMPETITION: L. & ECON. REV. 257 (2010).
59. See Quelch & Harding, supra note 58, at 102.
60. Id. at 102–03.
61. Id. at 107–08.
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labels to national brands as a corresponding increase would swing
sales to private labels from national brands.”62
Using brand strategy also allows a branded good to defeat a
private-label’s ability to compete. In one case in the United
Kingdom, Coca-Cola had lost a large amount of the soda market to
Classic Cola, the private label cola made by the Cott Corporation for
the supermarket Sainsbury.63 When Coca-Cola encountered Cott in
Canada, Coca-Cola leveraged its knowledge of soda consumers, price
power, relationship with retailers, and advertising—in others words
Coca-Cola used brand strategy—and “retaliated aggressively” to the
problem Cott’s product posed.64 Cott’s “profits as a percentage of
sales plummeted along with its stock price; the company then
moderated its ambitions to extend its private-label success formula to
other product categories.”65 Furthermore, the company decided to
target its future growth “at the expense of competitors smaller than
Coca-Cola.”66
Brands also have a dramatic effect on pricing and competition.
According to one author, brand power can be translated into price
power, with many customers willing to pay a 20, 25, or 30 percent
price premium for a branded good.67 Some customers even state that
price is not a factor when buying a brand to which they are loyal.68
In other words, for some, a branded good is highly price inelastic.
Outside the private label market, brands in general can pose
substantial entry barriers. As David Aaker has explained, even a large
corporation can have trouble launching a new brand because of the
cost required to build brand awareness, identity, and customers and
because of distribution barriers.69 Retailers may not carry a new
brand because they are not certain that it will survive and provide

62. Id. at 108.
63. Id. at 100.
64. Id. at 109.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. DAVIS, supra note 29, at 5.
68. See id. (“72 percent of customers say they will pay a 20 percent premium for their
brand of choice, relative to the closest competitive brand. 50 percent of customers will pay a
25 percent premium. 40 percent of customers will pay up to a 30 percent premium. 25 percent
of customers state the price does not matter if they are buying a brand that owns their
loyalty.”).
69. See David A. Aaker, Should You Take Your Brand to Where the Action Is?, 75 HARV.
BUS. REV. 135, 136–37 (1997).
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returns that justify displacing goods already taking up limited shelf
space.70
A study by economists Michael Baye and John Morgan lends
further support to the idea that branding has effects beyond what the
legal literature currently recognizes, including ensconcing price
dispersion, where, instead of a competitive market that brings prices
down, prices remain dispersed above marginal cost.71 The study
examined branding for consumer electronics with an average price of
$500 in a large online market, the most popular online consumer
electronics comparison shopping site.72 Consumers were separated
into loyals—those who buy only from a specific firm (i.e., branddriven buyers)—and shoppers—those who saw products as
identical.73 As the authors noted in describing their model, “[o]ne
can imagine that endogenizing brand-building might matter a great
deal. If brand advertising ultimately converted all consumers into
‘loyals,’ firms would find it optimal to charge the ‘monopoly’ price
74
and price dispersion would vanish.”
Price dispersion should go away in another situation. “[W]here
the number of potential competitors is ‘large,’” (as was the case in
the model) one might expect that price dispersion would “vanish,”
but, instead, “prices remain[ed] dispersed above marginal cost.”75
The study found that accounting for branding activities starts to
explain this result.76 Two other predictions important to the law’s
understanding of brands were borne out: “[w]hen brand advertising
is higher, average listed prices are also higher” and “[w]hen brand
advertising is higher, the average minimum listed price is also
higher.”77 Although the study acknowledges that more work needs to
be done in this field, for the purposes of our paper, the study
indicates that the legal understanding of how marks function fails to
capture certain key and potentially negative market effects branding
appears to have.78
70. Id. at 137.
71. See Michael R. Baye & John Morgan, Brand and Price Advertising in Online
Markets, 55 MGMT. SCI. 1139 (2009).
72. Id. at 1140, 1146.
73. Id. at 1139.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1139, 1140.
76. Id. at 1149.
77. Id. at 1145.
78. Id. at 1150.
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In short, although brands affect price, it appears that some
consumers are buying goods and services based on non-price
considerations. Consumers are buying goods that are arguably the
same but for a premium. Understanding other dimensions of
branding helps explain this behavior.
2. How brands use non-price factors to differentiate products and drive
purchasing decisions along non-functional dimensions
From the end of the nineteenth century to the middle of the
twentieth century to today, companies have had to find ways to
compete over selling essentially the same goods and manage excess
production capacity.79 Product design became a key factor in
developing and marketing a good because “the lack of obvious
differences between products made good appearance a ‘necessity.’”80
By the 1960s and 1970s, this new emphasis on design connected to
the larger aim of creating a brand that projected a singular corporate
identity with integrated design coordination and a more scientific
approach to marketing.81 A key insight was that brands allowed
companies to move beyond the 4 “P”s—product, price, place, and
promotion—which a competitor could duplicate, to include a fifth P,
personality of a company, which competitors could not copy.82
Although manufacturers used brands and marketing strategy to
provide information about why to purchase a new or branded good,
advertising and even a good’s packaging could communicate values
to encourage consumers to purchase one company’s product over a
competitor’s for reasons other than the price or quality of the
good.83
In both the United States and Britain one sees “the emergence
of a system that could link brand names to broader values and
79. MOOR, supra note 30, at 26–27.
80. Id. at 27 (citation omitted); DANESI, supra note 27, at 60–67 (detailing the
importance of product and package design through the examples of the automobile, perfume,
and tobacco industries).
81. See MOOR, supra note 30, at 30–31; LURY, supra note 32, at 20–22; cf. Moore &
Reid, supra note 15, at 3 (noting that branding has been a topic in marketing studies prior to
the 1970s but was only “a major topic of study” from 1970 forward).
82. LURY, supra note 32, at 24, 33–34; cf. DANESI, supra note 27, at 33 (explaining
brands as personalities with identities).
83. See MOOR, supra note 30, at 18–20; cf. Joachimsthaler & Aaker, supra note 57, at
39 (“[M]ass-media advertising has long been the cornerstone of most brand-building
efforts.”).
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meanings.”84 As Lury explains, in the 150 years of modern brand
history, companies used marketing, messaging, special events, and
more to offer the consumer the perception that the product carried
more than its functional qualities.85 Products had “essence[s]” that
met consumers’ psychological needs and lifestyle goals.86
Furthermore, this broad conception of the brand can be seen right
from the birth of the modern brand.87
For example, commercial images and standardized packaging
allowed for greater control over price and distribution while
simultaneously allowing companies to create a sense of nationhood
and belonging.88 For U.S. immigrant and rural populations who had
moved to cities, national goods became “the most familiar and stable
features of a strange new environment and, in some cases, the only
bond
between people who were
otherwise culturally
89
heterogeneous.” Buying goods became a sign of being an
American. National interests were also in play for Britain as it sought
to maintain its empire’s position.90 With the aid of the Empire
Marketing Board, images of Empire-era superior manufacturing,
military might, national pride, and in some cases claimed concern for
the plight of the labor force were found in cigarette, soap, candy,
and many other industries’ trademarks and packaging.91
Circa-1900 advertising shows that using a Kodak allowed one to
capture vacations and Christmas and keep them safe at home; writing
with a Waterman was for upscale writers; and owning Standard baths
and toilets meant one had entered the modern age.92 Companies
told stories and invented characters about how goods were made:
84. MOOR, supra note 30, at 23; DANESI, supra note 27, at 8.
85. See LURY, supra note 32, at 24; see also DANESI, supra note 27, at 10 (noting that
branding is 150 years old).
86. See LURY, supra note 32, at 24–25; cf. DANESI, supra note 27, at 8, 16 (describing
how advertising aims to persuade a consumer that a product will fulfill “emotional, social, and
other kinds of human needs.”).
87. See DANESI, supra note 27, at 12.
88. See MOOR, supra note 30, at 20–21.
89. Id. at 21; cf. Douglas B. Holt, Why Do Brands Cause Trouble? A Dialectical Theory
of Consumer Culture and Branding, 29 J. CONSUMER RES. 70, 82 (2002) (explaining that the
same stabilizing effect occurred as Americans moved from cities to suburbia, where they knew
no one and looked to brands as social anchors).
90. MOOR, supra note 30, at 21.
91. See id. at 21–23. These notions continue today in the form of British opposition, on
cultural and nationalistic grounds, to the takeover of iconic brand Cadbury by the U.S. firm
Kraft. See Henry Chu, Kraft’s Bid Has Brit’s Cheesed Off, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 18, 2010, at 17.
92. See STRASSER, supra note 33, at 101–15.

1444

DO NOT DELETE

1425

2/1/2011 4:41 PM

Brands, Competition, and the Law

Procter and Gamble soap was made by Brownies; Baker’s cocoa was
made in clean, new factories; elves made Post Toasties; kewpies made
Jell-O.93 Mr. Peanut wore a monocle, top-hat, and cane to evoke
sophistication.94 Images of old, wise women helped sell coffee, tea,
mattresses, and Crisco.95 Other culture’s symbols, such as the Dutch
girl in the clean, white cap, were used to sell cleaning products and
Heinz food goods.96
Other brand identity approaches mirror strategies begun in the
1900s. Heinz had the Heinz Ocean Pier in Atlantic City, which
welcomed 15,000 people per day who experienced Heinz’s version
of its history and how it made its products.97 Cadbury built Cadbury
World in 1990, which a study notes “vividly links [a customer’s]
taste experience to the brand’s history” and likely led to the
company being named “the most admired company in the United
Kingdom.”98 As discussed above, Nestlé built its Buitoni brand in
much the same way that Procter and Gamble built Crisco, but Nestlé
went even further by creating a club about the Italian lifestyle that
further drew on the brand as a way of defining how consumers
organized their lives.99 Adidas and Virgin parallel this customer
engagement strategy by offering urban lifestyles or innovative,
immersive entertainment experiences, respectively.100
In other words, brands allow companies to create a type of
product differentiation that might turn a commodity into a special
category that attains higher margins compared to other products in
that market space.101 One modern case study shows how in several
industries companies used brands and brand identity to demand
higher prices in what had been a commodity market or isolated
market. For example, the Body Shop offers a “profits-with-aprinciple” philosophy that has linked its business to social causes in a
93. Id. at 114–17.
94. See DANESI, supra note 27, at 45.
95. See STRASSER, supra note 33, at 118–20; DANESI, supra note 27, at 44–45.
96. See STRASSER, supra note 33, at 121.
97. Id.
98. Joachimsthaler and Aaker, supra note 57, at 46.
99. Id. at 46–47.
100. See, e.g., id. at 46–49 (detailing how Cadbury and Nestle used similar methods of
customer engagement and event marketing to build and maintain their brands); see also Henry
Chu, Kraft Takeover Bid of Cadbury Leaves Bitter Taste in Britain, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2010,
at A16 (“Like fish and chips or Marmite, Cadbury’s chocolate is part of what it means to be
British, a piece of identity you can taste.”).
101. See Aaker, supra note 69, at 141.
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market where most product “lines are indistinguishable.”102 The
Body Shop has differentiated its cosmetics line by turning it “into
something more than it has ever been.”103 Once it was suggested
that the Body Shop might be more talk than action, some
questioned whether the brand identity was bogus and how
divergence from its stated identity posed problems.104 The company
was nonetheless acquired by L’Oreal for £652.3 million in 2006
because of the way the Body Shop’s brand complemented L’Oreal’s
brand,105 thus proving that the talk may matter more than the action.
Likewise, Häagen-Dazs used branding so that its brand came to
mean “thicker, creamier, and pricier than any other ice cream on the
market; a sensual, self-indulgent, pleasurable treat targeted at
sophisticated, affluent adult consumers,” which allowed it to enter
the ice-cream market at “a price 30% to 40% higher than its closest
competitors and many times higher than the lower-priced
products.”106 Hugo Boss went from a 4 million DM a year company
to one with sales of “100 million in 1980 [that] increased tenfold
during the 1980s” because of its sponsorship strategy which raised
the brand’s visibility by affiliating with elite, exclusive events such as
Formula 1 racing and its placement on stylish television shows.107
SMH’s Swatch transformed the watch market from “either low-cost
time-measurement instruments or a high-cost combination of
heirloom and investment” to one where Swatch became the symbol
for Swiss watches that had a “stylish, fun, youthful, provocative, and
joyful brand personality.”108 In so doing, SMH created the fashion
watch market.109
102. Joachimsthaler and Aaker, supra note 57, at 40–41.
103. Id. at 41.
104. See, e.g., TILDE HEDING, CHARLOTTE F. KNUDTZEN & MOGENS BJERRE, BRAND
MANAGEMENT RESEARCH, THEORY AND PRACTICE 63 (2009) (noting the problem of
“misaligned identities” the Body Shop faced); John Entine, High St Chain’s Idealism Masks a
Harsh
Reality,
U.K.
MAIL,
Aug.
29,
2001,
available
at
http://www.jonentine.com/reviews/mail_on_Sunday_roddick.htm (reporting on claims of
environmental harms and poor treatment of developing countries’ industries as trading
partners).
105. L’Oreal Buys Body Shop for £652m, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 17, 2006, available at
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/loreal-buys-body-shop-forpound652
m-470244.html.
106. See Joachimsthaler and Aaker, supra note 57, at 41.
107. Id. at 44.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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These strategies arguably satisfy unmet demand, or create
demand, as early manufacturers sought to do. In either case, the
brand is used as a way to move beyond product, price, place, and
promotion, so that companies face less, or, ideally, no competition as
consumers remain loyal to the brand, even if a competitor offers an
arguably interchangeable good or service for the same or less cost.110
3. How brands assure quality and generate equity
Marks can and do come to represent source and quality and
reduce search costs—that is, consumers can buy an item repeatedly
by relying on the mark as an indicator that the product will be of the
same quality as previous purchases and continue to purchase or
choose not to purchase based on their experience with the good.111
That aspect of what a mark does is merely a part of a mark’s function
and, in fact, an unintended consequence. The desire to shape
markets and generate demand, at work during the early history of
trademarks, runs contrary to the neoclassical model of markets on
which the search costs theory is based. As shown above,
manufacturers use trademarks to differentiate Ivory soap from soap,
Swatch watches from watches, and so on as a strategy to extract
higher prices from consumers for essentially fungible commodities.112
Massive advertising and marketing resources were used to achieve
these goals, and trademarks were the vehicles that carried the goals
forward.113 Consumers imbued or attributed quality assurances to
companies, but that was not the only, or core, function of
manufacturers’ use of marks. It was simply a by-product of building a
national brand as a vital corporate asset.
As early as the 1920s, corporations had achieved success with the
strategy and people began asking for products by brand names.114
For example, in one study, 145 out of 147 grocers reported that
Campbell’s was the best selling soup.115 The American Tobacco
110. See DAVIS, supra note 29, at 5.
111. See David Higgins, The Making of Modern Trade Mark Law: the UK, 1860-1914, in
TRADEMARKS AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 42–43 (2008); accord
Diamond, supra note 13, at 289 (“A trademark does not necessarily guarantee good quality.
What it does guarantee is consistency.”).
112. See DANESI, supra note 27, at 1; DAVIS, supra note 29, at 3 (“A brand differentiates
products and services that appear similar in features, attributes, and possibly even benefits.”).
113. See DANESI, supra note 27, at 8–12.
114. Id. at 1.
115. STRASSER, supra note 33, at 52.
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Company was claimed to have had a total value of $227 million,
with $45 million of that value coming from its trademarks.116 Other
companies touted their marks’ value, like National Biscuit Company
claiming that its Uneeda mark was worth $6 million and Coca-Cola
claiming $5 million for its mark.117
During the 1980s, the shift to branding took a clearer role with
accepted, quantifiable results.118 Tangible assets went from being
“the greatest proportion of the amount bid for companies,” at the
start of the decade, to “only represent[ing] 30 per cent of this
amount, with intangible assets—usually in the form of brand
names—representing the larger share,” by decade’s end.119 And
today top brands have estimated values in the billions of dollars.120
As soon as brands were perceived as valuable assets, trademark
holders understandably began to use the law to address competition
related to the use of marks. For example, by the early 1900s, brands
had taken enough hold on the market that competitors began
copying national brands, and companies engaged in enforcement
strategies to prevent the use of their marks.121 In addition, the
growth of international trade, accompanied by the increased
counterfeiting of labels and marks, meant that U.S., U.K., and
especially French manufacturers sought better domestic and
international recognition of trademark protection.122
As explained further in part II, the way in which the law was used
to feed brand protection relied on the source/quality mantra. That
foundation is, by definition, ill-equipped to address the brand
functions that operate beyond the source/quality dimension. As
such, trademark law grew to protect brand interests without
116. Id. at 47.
117. Id.
118. Methods of brand valuation continue to be debated but the fact remains that brands
account for a growing proportion of a company’s overall valuation. See LURY, supra note 32, at
120 (examining the growth of the brand as an asset and that the London Stock Exchange
accepts brand valuation whereas the United States does not yet account for brand value on
balance sheets).
119. MOOR, supra note 30, at 34 (citation omitted); accord LURY, supra note 32, at 118.
120. See, e.g., Bloomberg supra note 1 (noting one brand valuation method’s assessment
of the top 100 brands ranging from Coca-Cola as the number one brand with a $65 billion
value to the 100th place brand being worth $3 billion and contested issues within brand
valuation).
121. STRASSER, supra note 33, at 48–52; cf. Duguid, French Connections, supra note 19
(explaining the role counterfeiting of international marks played in the evolution of trademark
law).
122. Duguid, French Connections, supra note 19, at 11–16.
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appreciating that it did so. Furthermore, trademark law protected
brands without asking whether it ought to.
B. Brand Lessons
Since the births of mass market, mass communication, and mass
transportation systems, companies have understood that trademarks
are but a small part of the brand. Although the roles and functions of
brands have only recently been explicitly theorized, business practices
beginning around 1900 reveal that companies were well-aware of the
way they could use brands to further a range of strategic objectives,
all of which zeroed in on one objective: competitive dominance
obtained by shaping preferences and extracting rents. Early
manufacturers used marks as a way to “get around the retailer” and
extract higher prices from consumers for otherwise interchangeable
goods.123
The same situation is found today. As Baye and Morgan explain
in their 2009 study regarding the online world, “[T]he branding
efforts of firms reduce the traffic enjoyed by the ‘information
gatekeeper’ operating the price comparison site,”124 and “appear to
reduce the value of the price comparison site.”125 In the past and
present, branding can and does undercut the way in which
consumers might otherwise shop and obtain the lowest price for
goods.
Brands are complex strategic tools that perform a variety of
functions including creating demand, circumventing middlemen so
that a company can reach consumers directly, controlling prices,
managing quality, providing a platform for trademark enforcement,
defining national identities, and satisfying a consumer’s emotional
and psychological needs. These functions, separately and in
combination, allow a company to differentiate products, avoid
commoditization of its products or services, and distinguish the
company and its goods or services from its competition, thus
building loyal customer bases for whom no other brand or item will
suffice. Regardless of what dimension or dimensions of a brand a
company pursues to build its brand, commentators recognize the
power of a strong brand. A strong brand creates the ability to attain
123. LURY, supra note 30, at 19.
124. See Baye & Morgan, supra note 71, at 1142–43.
125. Id. at 1150.
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“real and sustainable competitive advantage . . . [because] the
resulting effectiveness and efficiency of the program can represent
significant barriers to competitors.”126
The law, however, has ignored the full role of brands and
focused solely on the trademark, source/quality, and dimension of
brands. Accordingly, the law has only addressed notions of harm
done to a trademark and failed to capture the way companies use
brands as a competitive advantage and the possible harm brands can
pose for markets and consumers. In short, brands affect both price
and competition in ways that the law may not wish to foster but
currently fosters through a permissive trademark system that
effectively grants brand protection but fails to acknowledge that it
does so. The next section shows how trademark law reached this
state of affairs.
III. TRADEMARK LAW’S (LACK OF) UNDERSTANDING OF BRANDS
Thus far, we have shown the multi-dimensional aspect of brands
as opposed to the law’s conception of trademarks. This section
argues that trademark law protects brand interests, which are real
and important, without knowing that it is doing so. It may be that
the system should foster and even protect the way in which a
company tries to exploit its brand to create and/or satisfy consumer
needs that transcend source, quality, and/or price concerns. Before
one can address such issues, one must identify how that protection
occurs so that one can address the foundations of such potential
protections and the way in which such protections relate to both the
producer and consumer interests at stake.
In this section, we set forth the way in which the law and legal
theory related to trademarks has, regardless of explicit statements to
the contrary, supported brand interests beyond the source/quality
concerns of the search costs theory of trademarks. We then examine
certain aspects of trademark doctrine, such as initial interest
confusion, post-sale confusion, merchandising rights, and dilution
doctrine, as examples of trademark law that do not fare well at all
under the source/quality explanation of trademarks and argue that a
brand perspective better explains these doctrines.

126. Joachimsthaler & Aaker, supra note 57, at 50.
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A. Brands, Source, and Schechter

In 1926 Frank Schechter displayed an insightful understanding
of brand theory as he criticized trademark law for being “predicated
upon certain historical preconceptions as to the nature and function
of a trademark and as to the necessities for its protection.”127
Schechter sought to attack “[t]he orthodox definition of ‘the
primary and proper function of a trademark’ . . . given by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the leading case of Hanover
Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf: ‘to identify the origin or ownership of
the goods to which it is affixed.’”128 He documented how courts
struggled with this narrow conception of trademarks because, rather
than denoting personal ownership or origin of a good, “the
ramifications of modern trade and the national and international
distribution of goods from the manufacturer through the jobber or
importer and the retailer to the consumer [created a situation where]
the source or origin of the goods bearing a well known trademark is
seldom known to the consumer.”129 Despite the Supreme Court’s
view, Schechter argued that the law should follow courts that
recognized that consumers did not know who made Baker’s
Cocoa,130 Coca-Cola,131 or Yorkshire Relish,132 but instead
recognized a single and often anonymous source.133
According to Schechter:
The true functions of the trademark are, then, to identify a product
as satisfactory and thereby to stimulate further purchases by the
consuming public. The fact that through his trademark the
manufacturer or importer may “reach over the shoulder of the
127. Frank Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813, 813 (1926).
128. Id. at 813–14 (citing and quoting Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S.
403, 412 (1916)).
129. Id. at 814 (citing McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1877); Rouss v. Winchester
Co., 300 F. 706, 722–23 (2d Cir. 1924)); accord LURY, supra note 32, at 19 (describing early
brand strategy as seeking to “circumvent or limit the role of the retailer”).
130. Walter Baker & Co. v. Slack, 130 F. 514, 518 (7th Cir. 1904).
131. Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co., 254 U.S. 143, 146 (1920).
132. Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Co. v. Powell, [1897] A.C. 710 (H.L.) 715; Powell
v. Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Co., 13 Rep. Pat. Cas. 235, 250 (1896).
133. Schechter, supra note 127, at 816–17; (citing Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey
Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1918); Saalfield Publ’g. Co. v. Merriam Co., 238 F. 1,
8–9 (6th Cir. 1917); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921);
Deering Harvester Co. v. Whitman & Barnes Mfg. Co., 91 Fed. 376, 380 (6th Cir. 1898);
Hilton v. Hilton, 102 A. 16, 18 (N.J. Ch. 1917)).

1451

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/1/2011 4:41 PM

2010

retailer” and across the latter’s counter straight to the consumer
cannot be over-emphasized, for therein lies the key to any effective
scheme of trademark protection. To describe a trademark merely as
a symbol of good will, without recognizing in it an agency for the
actual creation and perpetuation of good will, ignores the most
potent aspect of the nature of a trademark and that phase most in
need of protection.134

Schechter’s view reflects part, but only part, of what the business
history shows: manufacturers were actively using marks to get
beyond anyone who stood in between manufacturers and
consumers.135 Rather than simply being a passive conduit of
information, the mark was an active agent of corporate strategy.136
Learned Hand captured this dynamic aspect of trademark strategy
when he wrote, “The art of advertising spuriously reinforced a
genuine demand by the power of reiterated suggestion. . . . [T]he
public was buying because it wanted, or had been made to think it
wanted, the biscuit which the plaintiff produced.”137 Even in 1918,
some courts understood that companies used their position and
advertising to build consumer relationships and generate demand.
Despite this partial recognition, Schechter surveyed the landscape
of trademark cases and their rationales and found both wanting. It
was a legal realist approach to trademark law.138 Under this view, the
law should expand its view of trademarks not only because of the
increased reach of trade,139 but because of business realities such as
the need to change or the desire to use a trademark established in
one product category for another category.140 Companies that
wanted to shift from selling war to peace goods, or to expand from
134. Schechter, supra note 127, at 818 (citing and quoting H.G. WELLS, 1 THE WORLD
(emphasis added).
135. See LURY, supra note 32, at 19.
136. See id. at 18, 46–47.
137. Shredded Wheat Co., 250 F. at 962–63 (emphasis added); cf. DANESI, supra note 27,
at 8 (describing how advertising aims to persuade a consumer that a product will fulfill
“emotional, social, and other kinds of human needs”).
138. See Robert Bone, Schechter’s Ideas in Historical Context and Dilution’s Rocky Road,
24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 469, 482–90 (2008) (describing the
general legal realist atmosphere of Schechter’s era, its connection to Columbia Law School
from where Schechter obtained his doctorate of law, and the way in which the legal realist
approach is seen in Schechter’s article).
139. Schechter, supra note 127, at 824.
140. Id. at 823; accord Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88
IOWA L. REV. 731, 743 (2003).
OF WILLIAM CLISSOLD 237 (1926))
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selling ice cream to selling milk, or from cheese to butter, had an
expanded view of what constituted a related product class and
wanted to prevent competitors from using marks such as Borden on
ice cream when Borden had already established itself as a milk
producer.141
The law, however, did not have such a view. According to
Schechter, the law’s focus on source confusion missed the point of
modern business entirely for “the creation and retention of custom,
rather than the designation of source, [was] the primary purpose of
the trademark . . . and . . . the preservation of the uniqueness or
individuality of the trademark [was] of paramount importance to its
owner.”142 Schechter’s insights regarding the way trademark
functioned and his proposal for legal protections that matched those
functions never explicitly took hold during his time.143
B. Goodwill and Confusion Doctrines Protecting Brands
Although Schechter’s brand-view of trademarks did not gain
traction, brand protection entered trademark law by defining the
concepts of goodwill and what constituted confusion broadly. Those
who desired expanded trademark protection obtained their wish as
the law chose to address the question of whether one could use
another’s trademark on non-competing goods by focusing on the
theory that goodwill is a form of property:
That theory focused on the goodwill that a mark symbolized and
protected that goodwill as the seller’s property. This goodwill-asproperty theory was flexible enough to support broad trademark
protection provided “goodwill” was defined to include goodwill
that attached to the firm as well as to the particular brand. . . . The
goodwill-as-property theory was capable of reconciling seller
protection with the dominant and persistent consumer protection
strand of trademark law. The way a defendant injured or
appropriated a plaintiff’s firm goodwill was by confusing consumers
about sponsorship. Therefore, protecting a mark against

141. See Schechter, supra note 127, at 823; accord Nelson, supra note 140, at 743.
142. Schechter, supra note 127, at 822 (emphasis added).
143. Compare Nelson, supra note 140, at 739, 757–58 (noting courts hostility to
Schechter’s idea and how the history surrounding the Lanham Act’s passage removed dilution
from the initial act’s iteration), with Bone, supra note 138, at 492–96 (indicating other reasons
for the doctrine’s failure to take hold in its early days).
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sponsorship confusion prevented harm to the seller at the same
time as preventing harm to the consumer.144

Thus trademark law paid lip service to consumer protection and
imported a notion of goodwill that opened the door to expanded
producer protection, but without any clear grounding for that shift.
Several different criticisms were made about this approach to
trademark law. For one, defining goodwill is difficult.145 Goodwill
seems to be connected to a consumer’s tendency to make repeat
purchases from a certain source, which is more of an effect than
telling one what goodwill is, in which case it is based on a backward
inference about cause that is not always (or perhaps ever) justified;
but it could also be understood as a company’s reputation or a
company’s value beyond its tangible assets.146 Why, and if so how,
the law ought to protect this interest was unclear.
The legal realists of the era argued that formalist property
approaches erred and ignored what they held to be the best policy
for trademark law: preventing source confusion.147 Those concerned
about monopolies understood that companies were using advertising
and psychological tools to build loyalty to encourage consumers to
buy goods or services based on something other than rational choice
and objected to protecting goodwill on the grounds that this
practice was anti-competitive.148 In sum, those in favor of more
property-like treatment of trademarks saw the way businesses
leveraged marks while others looked to the way marks seemed to
affect consumers.
Neither approach integrated the business practices and attendant
concerns well, if at all. The opposing perspectives are simultaneously
correct and incorrect, because they fail to grasp or address all the
ways a brand works and instead focus on narrow conceptions of
144. Bone, supra note 138, at 493; cf. Glynn Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, 49 EMORY
L.J. 367, 371–72 (1999) (explaining the growth of “property mania” in trademark law).
145. See, e.g., Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment “With Goodwill”: A Concept Whose
Time Has Gone, 57 FLA. L. REV. 771, 799 (2005) (“[G]oodwill is an ill-defined term that is
difficult to frame in a legislative context and that has taken different forms over the decades.”);
Desai & Rierson, supra note 1, at 1794 n.18.
146. Desai & Rierson, supra note 1, at 1794–95 (noting differences in brand valuation
methods but the asserted connection between brand value and goodwill); accord Bone, supra
note 42, at 583–84.
147. See, e.g., Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Competition: The Recent History, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 13, 15 (1996); accord Bone, supra note 42, at 586–89.
148. See Bone, supra note 42, at 590–92.
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trademark as it was understood at the time. This perspective zeroed
in on a desired end without seeing the more general effects that
brands have.
Trademark case law also struggled with the multi-dimensional
aspect of brands. Although trademark law was technically supposed
to address “directly competing products and passing off or source
confusion,”149 around the 1920s cases lauded by people such as
Schechter started to protect non-competing goods. Under these
cases, one could not make Aunt Jemima syrup when the Aunt
Jemima pancake mix is already on the market because consumers
may think the two products are from the same source.150 Given the
way companies were expanding product lines, this claim was not
absurd. As companies made incremental changes to their businesses
and product lines, a court could plausibly hold that certain product
categories were related enough that a newcomer-competitor could
not use a mark in that new market. Yet, other cases went further and
enjoined using marks for locks as marks for flashlights, marks for cars
as marks for radio tubes, marks for watches as marks for shoes, marks
for tobacco products as marks for shirts, marks for jewelry as marks
for motion pictures, and more.151
David Post explains this problem as a “phase transition”:
[O]ne orderly arrangement of the interlocking parts of a complex
system gives way, rather suddenly, to an entirely different
arrangement. Think of the transformation of liquid water into solid
ice. As the temperature falls, the individual components of the
system—the hydrogen and oxygen atoms and the bonds between
them—slowly change, releasing small quanta of energy, while
retaining the orderly arrangement that defines the “liquid” state.
But at the freezing point, the system abandons gradualism,
changing abruptly into a different kind of orderly arrangement of
its atoms, an entirely different configuration.152

149. Id. at 593; Lunney, supra note 144, at 391; Nelson, supra note 140, at 742–44.
150. Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 408, 410 (2d Cir. 1917);
accord Lunney, supra note 144, at 392.
151. Bone, supra note 42, at 595–96; accord Nelson, at 759–60 (examining how the
courts in Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Prods., Inc., 264 N.Y.S. 459 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1932) quoted
and incorporated Schechter’s ideas and opened the door to dilution rationales in confusion
cases).
152. David Post, Against “Against Cyberanarchy”, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365, 1378
n.60 (2002).
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Each little step in trademark law may have made sense in isolation,
but at some point the aggregate creates an entirely new system.
By the middle of the twentieth century, some courts tried to
cabin trademark law by holding that “[o]nly two types of harm
mattered: loss of current customers due to a reputation injury
created by defendant’s lower quality product, or loss of future
customers due to the plaintiff’s inability to enter a new market with
its mark.”153 These were still broad ideas, loosely applied, and in
some cases certainly not fully tied to the idea of consumer search
costs.
Courts looking to reputation and loss of future customers began
importing brand ideas into the law. Brand theory openly looks to the
brand to support much more than a specific product, and specifically
includes the idea that one “build[s] a brand not around products but
around reputation,”154 in addition to the idea that the brand allows a
corporation to create diffusion products. A company can offer not
just one product but a range of goods and services at different prices
and market points so that a range of people can have “access to the
brand.”155
By the late twentieth century, the law yet again changed its
approach to trademarks and re-embraced expanding its reach. Shifts
in economic and marketing theory began in the 1960s and 1970s
and took full hold by the 1980s.156 Faith in markets and trademarks
as conveyors of information enabling efficient, rational choices by
efficient, rational market participants animated the trademark law
and policy. Yet, as trademark law protected non-point-of-sale
confusion, brand oriented protection crept deeper into trademark
law without most realizing it.
C. Trademark Doctrines Better Explained as Brand Protection
Trademark law has come under scrutiny for expanding its reach.
Many of the criticisms focus on how trademark law strays from
point-of-sale confusion and protects interests other than those the
153. Bone, supra note 42, at 599 (citing Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk Co.,
132 F.2d 822, 825 (2d Cir. 1943) (Hand, J.); S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 116 F.2d
427, 429 (2d Cir. 1940) (Hand, J.)); cf. Nelson, supra note 140, at 743–45.
154. LURY, supra note 32, at 121 (quoting Richard Branson’s explanation of branding)
(citation omitted).
155. Id. at 25, 61–62.
156. See Bone, supra note 42, at 602–04; see generally William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987).
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search cost theory of trademarks supports. The open question is,
what then do these doctrines protect? Rather than arguing that they
protect a more property-like view of trademark, we believe that
brands better explain what has happened in these expanded areas of
protection.
For example, the initial interest confusion doctrine tries to
prevent the following situation. A consumer is drawn to a provider of
goods or services because of a name or logo. The consumer arrives at
the provider’s place of business and quickly realizes that this provider
is not the one the consumer was seeking. The provider, however,
offers the same or almost the same goods, and the consumer decides
that it is best to close the deal with the provider. Unlike the problem
where a consumer buys a good mistakenly thinking it is from
Producer A when in fact it is from Producer B, in these cases, the
consumer has suffered some costs in finding A but knows that she is
buying something from a different producer, and any short-fall in
quality will be attributed to Producer B. The consumer is not
confused by the time she purchases the good, and the doctrine has
little to do with rational choice problems that traditionally animate
trademark law.157
Post-sale confusion is another example where a consumer is not
confused and search costs are not at stake.158 The consumer knows
that she bought an imitation Gucci bag or Rolex watch. The
doctrine holds that the harm lies in others possibly being fooled into
thinking that the item was genuine and protects the prestige of the
mark.159
Until recently, trademark law prohibited licensing a trademark
without quality control, because such practices would erode the
source and quality function of a trademark.160 This position has given
way to the recognition and protection of merchandising rights which
prevent someone from making T-shirts, mugs, posters, and so on
157. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of
Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 164–65 (2005); cf. Katz, supra note 21, at 1597
(arguing that initial interest confusion could be justified if search costs truly increased but that
the “number of such cases is probably very small”).
158. See Lunney, supra note 144, at 404–08.
159. Id. at 407–08.
160. See Irene Calboli, The Sunset of “Quality Control” In Modern Trademark Licensing,
57 AM. U. L. REV. 341, 351–52 (2007); cf. Calboli, supra note 145, at 776 (arguing “for a
change toward free trademark transferability, or assignment ‘with or without’ goodwill, to
eliminate the ambiguities and inconsistencies created by the current [trademark law]”).
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with sports team logos or company brands, despite there being no
confusion as to the source or quality of the product.161 Consumers
can know full well that these items are not licensed. They are not
confused nor do they lack information as they purchase.162 Still,
trademark law will in some cases prevent unlicensed manufacturers
from producing such goods.163
In all these examples, source, quality, and confusion concerns of
the consumer do not explain why the underlying practices are
prohibited. Once one takes a brand perspective, however, these
doctrines begin to make sense. Initial interest confusion protects a
company’s investment in creating a product category, advertising its
goods, and reaching directly to the customer. It also aids in limiting
comparative advertising that may interfere with certain notions of
brand-building. Post-sale confusion protects a company’s desire to
build and manipulate identity and personality aspects of a brand.
Merchandising rights cases protect a company’s interest in
generating and controlling consumer identity.
Whether the law ought to protect these interests and, if so, how
it should do so, are normative questions. The point here is that the
law should be more aware of what it is allowing. The law’s ignorance
of brand logic leads to results that make little sense under the current
claimed foundations of trademark law. Indeed, the failure to
appreciate brand theory explains some of the problems one of the
more infamous parts of trademark law, dilution, has encountered.
The original federal statute for dilution simply stated that the
holder of a famous mark may bring a claim for dilution and obtain
an injunction against the junior user of the mark if that use “causes
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.”164 Under the revised
federal statute, a claim may still only be brought by the holder of a
famous mark, but now the junior user’s use must be “likely to cause
161. See generally Calboli, supra note 160; see also LURY, supra note 32, at 108
(explaining that British trademark law was revised in 1994 to allow trafficking in a mark which
is analogous to the U.S. merchandising right).
162. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or
Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 471–72 (2005) (“[T]he mark in these cases is rarely
serving the traditional function of a trademark. Rather than indicating something to the
consumer about the source . . . of a product, the mark is the product . . . .”).
163. See, e.g., Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg. 510 F.2d 1004,
1008 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975); see also Calboli, supra note 145, at
799; LURY, supra note 32, at 108 (explaining that British trademark law was revised in 1994 to
allow trafficking in a mark which is analogous to the U.S. merchandising right).
164. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
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dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark”
for the holder to have a remedy under the cause of action.165 In
addition, the revised statute explicitly states that a dilution claim may
be brought “regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely
confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury.”166
Although the revised statute sought to narrow some parts of the
doctrine by clarifying what constitutes a famous mark and defining
the types of dilution, the essence of a dilution claim remained:
holders of famous marks can sue junior users even when the junior
user does not compete with the mark holder, there is no likelihood
of confusion, or there is no quantifiable economic harm.
Dilution has been subject to intense criticism and scrutiny in
legal academia.167 Clarisa Long captures the range of criticisms:
Ever since the creation of federal dilution law, legal commentators
have expressed consternation about this variation of the trademark
entitlement. Dilution law has been called “absolute and
unlimitable,”
“powerful,”
and
“immensely
popular.”
Commentators have labeled dilution law “a fundamental shift in
the nature of trademark protection,” concluded that “plaintiffs
frequently win” their dilution claims, and wondered whether the
statute will prove to be a “disaster.” Some commentators are
concerned that dilution law represents an expansion in property
rights at the expense of the public domain. Others worry that it
stifles expression, hampers commercial communication, or reduces
competition. Richard Posner frets about dilution’s “seductive
appeal.”168

From a traditional, search-costs and information view, these
criticisms have much force.169 Dilution law, however, is not
concerned with consumers’ search costs and maps its roots in
165. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1029–30 (2006);
Nelson, supra note 140, at 732.
168. Long, supra note 167, at 1029–30 (footnotes omitted).
169. See also LURY, supra note 32, at 109 (noting growth of dilution doctrine in the
United Kingdom and shift from confusion to more expansive protection against all uses of a
mark). But see Long, supra note 167, at 1031 (arguing that doctrine has added little to
enforcement power of trademark holders); Lunney, supra note 144, at 408–10 (“[dilution]
was often tacked onto the court’s opinion as little more than an afterthought”); Barton Beebe,
The Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence from the First Year of Trademark
Dilution Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 449, 450
(2008) (showing that the revised act also seems to add little power to trademark enforcement).
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Schechter’s argument that trademark law should protect “the
creation and retention of custom, rather than the designation of
source . . . and . . . the preservation of the uniqueness or
individuality of the trademark [because that] is of paramount
importance to its owner.”170 “[D]ilution law is producer-focused
rather than consumer-focused: It seeks to prevent diminution in the
value of a famous mark stemming from the use of the mark by
someone other than the trademark bolder [sic].”171
Providing legal recourse based on a company’s “investment in
the mark” and its construction of a mark’s “aura” fits directly into
the way brand strategy operates. When Congress explained the Act
as protecting “the substantial investment the owner has made in the
mark and the commercial value and aura of the mark itself,”172 it
implicitly took a brand view of trademarks.173 Such perspectives
acknowledge that companies that seek to construct an identity and
personality for a mark and have those traits offer something much
more than information to the consumer. In other words, criticisms
that dilution is far removed from trademark law’s search-cost and
consumer-focused foundations are accurate but miss the point that
trademark law has already imported a brand perspective into its
doctrine. Dilution, like the other brand-based extensions of
trademark law in recent times, can be seen as merely the most
obvious iteration of that view.
IV. ANTITRUST LAW’S FAILURE TO GRASP THE POWER OF BRANDS
Whereas trademark law failed to appreciate how it protected
brands while still claiming to be concerned with consumer confusion
and search costs, antitrust law has never fully understood the role of
brands. Because of this misunderstanding, antitrust law has never
developed an appropriate set of tools designed to measure brand
power, distinguish lawful branding techniques from unlawful
exclusionary conduct, or design functional remedies to deal with
these issues. In this Part, we focus on the missed opportunities to
170. Schechter, supra note 127, at 822 (emphasis omitted).
171. Long, supra note 167, at 1034; e.g., Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S.
418, 429 (2003) (noting that dilution law is aimed at protecting producers and not
consumers).
172. H.R. REP. NO. 104–374, at 3 (1995).
173. But see Lunney, supra note 144, at 474–76 (arguing that the Federal Dilution Act of
1995 imported source confusion and “does not reflect a purely property-based view of
trademarks”).
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incorporate the key aspects of brand management into competition
policy and show how an understanding of modern branding can
provide a tool to address issues such as market power, market
definition, merger enforcement, and vertical restraints as exemplified
by resale price maintenance doctrine.
A. Missed Opportunities: Antitrust’s View of Product Differentiation
and Struggle to Understand Brands
Antitrust law and economics in the early decades of the twentieth
century missed an early opportunity to take advantage of the
growing importance of brands and, more generally, product
differentiation. Edward Chamberlin, one of antitrust’s pioneering
economists, was deeply interested in this topic and made it the focus
of his principal work, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition.174
In Monopolistic Competition, he investigated the vast middle
ground between perfect or pure competition and monopoly. At the
time, the only middle ground had been the exploration of duopoly
by Cournot and others.175 Chamberlin instead focused on product
differentiation, the critical real world phenomenon that rendered
useless the prevailing models of pure monopoly and perfect
competition.
As he noted:
Where there is any degree of differentiation whatever, each seller
has an absolute monopoly of his own product, but is subject to the
competition of more or less imperfect substitutes. Since each is a
monopolist and yet has competitors, we may speak of them as
“competing monopolists,” and, with peculiar appropriateness, of
the forces at work as those of “monopolistic competition.”176

Chamberlin defined product differentiation broadly.177 He viewed
patents, trademarks, and copyrights as critical for product
differentiation and considered them monopolies, though normally in
competition with other more or less imperfect substitutes.178 He was
uncertain whether patents or trademarks had the greater potential for
174. EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC
COMPETITION: A RE-ORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE (8th ed. 1962).
175. ANTOINE A. COURNOT, RICHERCHES SUR LESPRINCIPES MATHEMA-TIQUES DE LA
THEORIE DES RICHESSES (1838); FRANCIS Y. EDGEWORTH, MATHEMATICAL PHYSICS (1881).
176. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 174, at 9.
177. Id. at 56–57.
178. Id. at 60–61.
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monopoly power and pointed to the example of the prestige value of
such 1930s brand names as Coca-Cola, Ivory, and Kodak.179
Regardless of which was more important, patents or trademarks, all
types of intellectual property were critical in preventing the erosion
of high returns. Intellectual property rights rendered competitors
unable to create effective substitutes because of strong consumer
preferences for the IP protected products.180
Chamberlin conceived of competition as a spectrum where
perfect competition and monopoly were limits, not equilibriums.181
He noted: “As long as the substitutes are to any degree imperfect,
[the producer] still has a monopoly of his own product and control
over its price within the limits imposed upon any monopolist—those
of the demand.”182 The closeness of the available substitutes
determined the extent that price would exceed and quantity would
fall short of the predictions of a competitive model.183
For Chamberlin, product differentiation changes one’s world
view.184 However, product differentiation does not automatically
produce classical monopoly. Even if every producer has a monopoly
of his own variety of product, he still faces the competition of
imperfect substitutes.185 Because the competitive ideal was no longer
possible in a world of differentiated products, “[h]ow much and
what kinds of monopoly, and with what measure of social control,
become the questions.”186
As Rudolph Peritz notes, Chamberlin’s theory of monopolistic
competition transformed traditional notions of a market for goods
and services “into a commercial marketplace of ideas and images.”187
Unfortunately,
Chamberlin’s
insights
regarding
product
differentiation and brands as they existed in his time were never
deeply integrated into antitrust policy. He is cited in only a limited

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 62.
Id. at 111–12.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 103–04, 112, 117.
Id. at 204–05.
Id. at 205–06.
Id. at 214–15.
RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888–1992: HISTORY,
RHETORIC, LAW 109 (1996).
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number of places, but never relied upon, in the contemporary legal
or economic treatises, textbooks, and court opinions.188
Other commentators have glimpsed the importance of brands
but similarly had little effect on modern antitrust law and policy on
this issue. For example, Joe Bain had important insights into the
importance of advertising for competition policy.189 Bain, however,
did not move beyond advertising into the broader concept of the
brand, and much of his work on advertising and his broader interest
in the structure of markets has been rejected by price theory and
other “Chicago School” approaches to competition policy.190
Lester Telser, a figure more associated with the Chicago School,
provides an unexpected example where antitrust literature
understood why brands matter. In his 1972 book, Telser recognized
the price premium aspect of successful branding and called for its
recognition in market definition and the measurement of market
power.191 Unfortunately, as with Chamberlin, most recent
commentators and courts have not engaged Bain or Telser on these
points or have too reflexively come to the opposite conclusion.192
Despite these apparent blind spots, there has been a somewhat
greater willingness to recognize the importance of premium brands
as opposed to value brands and branded products as a separate
market segment from the unbranded and private label segments of
the same industry. For example, the 2006 Commentary to the
Merger Guidelines discusses several enforcement actions in the
188. See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. United States, 386 U.S. 372, 448 n.9 (1967);
FTC v. H.J. Heinz, 246 F.3d 708, 724 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Int’l Detective Serv., Inc. v.
Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 613 F.2d 1067, 1075 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1979); N. Natural Gas
Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 399 F.2d 953, 965 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Pevely Dairy Co. v.
United States, 178 F.2d 363, 368 (8th Cir. 1950); Durable, Inc. v. Twin Cnty. Groceries
Corp., 839 F. Supp. 257, 261 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); United States v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 137 F. Supp. 78, 93 nn.22–23 (S.D. Cal. 1956); DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY
M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 318, 344 (1990); W. KIP VISCUSI,
JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND
ANTITRUST 87–88, 119 (4th ed. 2005). But see F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (3d ed. 1990) in which Chamberlin’s
work is more central.
189. See 1, 2 JOE S. BAIN & P. DAVID QUALLS, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: A
TREATISE 310–11, 395–96 (1987); JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR
CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 115, 217 (1956).
190. Timothy J. Muris, Improving the Economic Foundations of Competition Policy, 12
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2003).
191. LESTER G. TELSER, COMPETITION, COLLUSION AND GAME THEORY (1972).
192. E.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
HARV. L. REV. 937, 956–57 (1981).
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butter, flour, tissue, and bread industries where branded products
were recognized as distinct markets for merger analysis, despite the
presence of important producers of generic and private label
goods.193 In addition, there is an older Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) challenge to a merger in the soft drink industry that
focused on the major branded segment of the industry as the
relevant market for merger analysis.194
Furthermore, there are some meaningful engagements with the
broader effects of branding on market definition, such as the second
edition of the Sullivan & Grimes treatise which states:
When market power is properly defined as power over price, it is
clear that sellers of branded products often exercise market power.
Just as a pure monopolist, the seller of a branded good may face an
inelastic demand curve, allowing it to raise price without losing
offsetting sales revenues. . . . A seller with a powerful brand, for
example, may have brand-loyal consumers who will absorb price
increases rather than switch to a different brand. The basis for this
brand loyalty may be accurate information about the characteristics
of the favored brand and all rival offerings. But brand loyalty may
also be based on inaccurate, out-of-date or incomplete information.
Brand loyalty will be reinforced by “satisficing” conduct—where
market actors are not constantly reevaluating their alternatives and
patterns tend to stabilize and be repeated until something
disorienting occurs.195

193. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMENTARY ON THE
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(2006),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/215247.pdf [hereinafter Commentary to the Merger Guidelines] (citing United
States v. Dairy Farmers of Am., 2001-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 73,136 (E.D. Pa. 2000); United
States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. and Scott Paper Co., 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,405
(N.D. Tex. 1995); United States v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶
71,271 (N.D. Ill. 1995)); cf., Commission Decision 2002/156/EC in Case COMP/M.2097
– SCA/Metsa Tissue, 2002 O.J. (L 57) 1 at ¶¶ 84, 94 (barring merger under EU merger
regulation combining four major brands where minor brands not effective substitutes).
194. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of the Sw. v. FTC, 85 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 1996); cf.
Commission Decision 98/327/EC in Case IV/M.833 – The Coca-Cola Company/Carlsberg
A/S, 1998 O.J. (L 145) 41 at ¶¶ 72–73, 110, 118 (permitting soft drink merger reducing
international brands from four to three upon condition of divestiture of brand and assets). See
generally, Ezrachi & Bernitz, supra note 58.
195. LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK § 2.4e, at 43 (2d ed. 2000) (footnote omitted); see also Warren S.
Grimes, Brand Marketing, Intrabrand Competition, and the Multibrand Retailer: The
Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 83 (1995).
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In this field, like most of life, “always” and “never” are always
never the right answers. Yet from the time of Edward Chamberlin to
the present, two crucial questions remain: When do brands confer
meaningful market power, and how to integrate brand management
into the calculus of existing antitrust analysis. Even critics of
Chamberlin acknowledge that the key issue is identifying the
“noticeable ‘gap[s] in the chain of substitutes.’”196
As a general matter, despite robust economic theories about
product differentiation, antitrust law and policy have not done a
good job of incorporating these insights. In addition, the brand and
business literature is quite clear about the way brands are used to
achieve product differentiation and control price. As one business
school professor noted in a recent hearing before the FTC and the
Antitrust Division about the importance of brands:
[W]hat’s missing from all that is the search for and the attempt to
maximize scarcity rents. And that’s kind of what brands are about.
In brands you are trying to create a scarce asset and try to extract as
much profit as you can from that scarce asset that you’re creating.
And that’s an awful lot about what business is trying to do left and
right. And I think, to a large extent, the way we think about
antitrust, both economists and lawyers often kind of misses that.
And I think that perspective is enormously useful.197

Put differently, cultivating powerful brands is the principal
competitive strategy of many actors who antitrust purports to
regulate. Yet, rather than embrace these perspectives, the antitrust
world heavily discounts what is obvious to the business world, that
brands matter and can be the source of durable competitive
advantage and the ability to sell at a premium without significant
constraint from potentially competing substitutes.
The rise of the Chicago School as the prevailing economic
discourse for antitrust reinforced the focus on price theory to the
196. Richard Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The Realemon
Case 127 U. PA. L. REV. 994, 1010 (1979) (quoting JOAN ROBINSON, ECONOMICS OF
IMPERFECT COMPETITION 5 (2d ed. 1969)). As Schmalensee noted in general that perfect
markets are rare, short term market power is ubiquitous, but “[a]s long as the goods or services
thus aggregated are close enough substitutes, their prices will move together, and an
appropriate price index can thus serve as a useful summary statistic.” Id. Schmalensee errs by
assuming that most markets have close substitutes.
197. Mr. Robert Gertner, Testimony before Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review
Project: A Series of Five Workshops 46 (Dec. 10, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/hmg/transcripts/091210transcriptchicago.pdf.
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exclusion of most other factors.198 It relegated business discourse to
the fringes of the profession of antitrust, whether practiced by the
liberal or conservative wings of the discipline. Consider this quote by
Judge Easterbrook about predatory pricing as an example of the
prevailing ethos in antitrust law:
Firms “intend” to do all the business they can, to crush their rivals
if they can. . . . Rivalry is harsh, and consumers gain the most when
firms slash costs to the bone and pare price down to cost, all in
pursuit of more business. Few firms cut price unaware of what they
are doing; price reductions are carried out in pursuit of sales, at
others’ expense. Entrepreneurs who work hardest to cut their prices
will do the most damage to their rivals, and they will see good in it.
You cannot be a sensible business executive without understanding
the link among prices, your firm’s success and other firms’ distress.
If courts use the vigorous, nasty pursuit of sales as evidence of
forbidden “intent,” they run the risk of penalizing the motive
forces of competition.199

Now compare Judge Easterbrook’s rhetoric to that used by
Michael Porter, an economist by training who established a
preeminent reputation as a business strategist. In his classic treatise,
Competitive Strategy, Porter lays out a roadmap of how to build and
increase entry barriers, mobility barriers, and switching costs to
maintain competitive advantage in the face of a strategic challenge
from another firm.200 In his catalogue of strategies for raising
structural barriers, increasing expected retaliation, and lowering the
inducement for attack, he continues to emphasize product
differentiation as the most effective strategy for obtaining a
sustainable competitive advantage, while downplaying price
competition.201 He tellingly states: “Any fool can cut the price, goes

198. Spencer Weber Waller, The Language of Law and the Language of Business, 52 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 283, 283–84 (2001); Spencer Weber Waller, The Use of Business Theory in
Antitrust Litigation, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 119, 120 (2003).
199. A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401–02 (7th
Cir. 1989). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6
(1984).
200. MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING
INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS (1980).
201. Id. at 21–22, 170–71. Or as one business commentator more succinctly noted:
“Differentiate or die.” JILL GRIFFIN, TAMING THE SEARCH-AND-SWITCH CONSUMER:
EARNING CUSTOMER LOYALTY IN A COMPULSION-TO-COMPARE WORLD 119 (2009).
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the old maxim, and a firm often hurts itself more than the challenger
in defending in this way.”202
As a result of this cognitive dissonance, there has been a limited
incorporation of brand management in antitrust.203 As in trademark
law, this incoherence has allowed the continued and virtually
unchecked growth of brand power. Strategic brand management has
grown with little or no IP or antitrust consequences even where
branding is a basis for meaningful market power as traditionally
defined in antitrust law. In other cases, a brand perspective may show
that there is less, not more, cause for antitrust concern. Yet, given
that antitrust does not understand branding, antitrust cannot
coherently navigate when brands have, or do not have, negative
effects. In short, applying a knowledge of brands to antitrust law
provides at least two benefits. First, understanding brands is
necessary if antitrust law is to make coherent decisions about the
businesses it regulates. Second, brands offer a powerful way to
understand and improve specific aspects of antitrust doctrine and
analysis.
B. Where Antitrust Can Learn from Brands
Although there are numerous antitrust cases which involve
trademarks in some way, most of these contain no discussion, let
alone analysis, of the role of brands more generally. Several reasons
account for this peculiarity. First, most courts do not distinguish
between the general issue of brands and the specific, but lesser, role
of trademarks in supporting the larger branding effort. Second, most
of the leading trademark-antitrust cases have been relatively easy
cases where the use or licensing of a trademark has been a sham
designed to implement a typical per se unlawful price fixing or
market division conspiracy.204 Thus, trademarks (and sometimes
202. MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND SUSTAINING
SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE 501 (1985) [hereinafter PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE].
203. Mark D. Whitener, Business Strategy and Antitrust: Editor’s Note, 21 ANTITRUST 5
(Fall 2006) (stating that Business school perspective is “probably the least understood by most
antitrust practitioners.”); Joseph P. Guiltinan, Choice and Variety in Antitrust Law: A
Marketing Perspective, 21 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 260 (2002) (observing that, because of
an emphasis on price, antitrust has tended to ignore non-price aspects which a marketing
theory can illuminate).
204. See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990); United States v. Sealy, Inc.,
388 U.S. 350 (1967); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); see
generally 2 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW §§ 30.5,
31.1 n.8 (2009) (collecting cases).
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brands) were important factually, but not analytically, in deciding
these cases.
More troubling, antitrust law does not take its own methods
seriously when applied to brands. As a result, antitrust law has tilted
toward a laissez-faire, hands-off approach in a number of areas where
the questions are much more difficult and complex than normally
acknowledged. This section examines issues of market definition, all
the different stages of merger analysis, and vertical distribution issues
as areas where a more significant analysis of the power of brands
leads to a richer analysis, even if it does not always change the
outcome. The section also briefly analyzes the area of after-market
restrictions where the brand issue has been discussed but ironically
has served as a red herring to obscure the real issues at stake.
1. Brands and the curious case of market definition
Antitrust law depends heavily on market definition in almost
every case and investigation except for hard-core price fixing and
other cartel activity. Antitrust law has used a number of related, but
slightly different, methods to define the group of products and
services that are viewed as effectively competing with each other.
None have properly taken account of the power of brands.
The modern law of market definition began with the Supreme
Court’s 1956 decision in a monopolization case involving DuPont,
the company which invented cellophane. Market definition was
crucial to the case because monopolization law requires both proof
of market power (the power to raise price or exclude competition)
and an exclusionary act which injures competition.205 While DuPont
dominated sales of cellophane, it argued that the true relevant
market was a much broader market for flexible wrapping materials in
which it lacked any significant market share or power.206
The Court held that the relevant market for antitrust purposes
consisted of those products and services which were reasonably
interchangeable.207 The opinion also identified cross-elasticity of
demand, whether a decrease in price for one product would

205. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 389 (1956) (citing
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 85 (1911)).
206. Id. at 381.
207. Id. at 395.
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substantially reduce demand for potentially competing products, as a
critical element in defining the contours of the market.208
The Court specifically rejected an important role for brands in
this analysis, stating the “power that . . . automobile or soft-drink
manufacturers have over their trademarked products is not the power
that makes an illegal monopoly.”209 The majority concluded that,
except for some niche aspects of the industry, cellophane did in fact
compete with such alternatives as glassine and greaseproof papers
and that any attempted price increase for cellophane would cause
substantial defection to these other wrapping materials for most
foods and other pre-packaged consumer products.210 As a result,
DuPont could not be liable for monopolization because it lacked any
significant market power in the properly defined market despite the
possibility that the DuPont cellophane brand conferred substantial
real world power.
The Supreme Court returned to the question of market
definition in its 1962 Brown Shoe merger decision.211 As in DuPont,
the Court held that the outer boundary of a relevant market for
antitrust purposes is set by reasonable interchangeability and crosselasticity of demand.212 The Court likewise indicated that “practical
indicia” of how the products or services were sold and perceived by
consumers were also relevant parts of the analysis.213 The Court
concluded that “submarkets” within broader markets may be
relevant for antitrust purposes.214
The 1982 Merger Guidelines and its subsequent iterations
introduced a somewhat more technical version of the same type of
analysis to guide the Antitrust Division and the FTC in deciding
whether to challenge proposed mergers and acquisitions between
horizontal competitors.215 These guidelines, as revised, have been
208. Id. at 400.
209. Id. at 393.
210. Id. at 401, 403 nn.29 & 31. While many commentators have pointed out the socalled “Cellophane Fallacy,” that relying on cross-elasticity of demand under these
circumstances produced an unnecessarily broad relevant market (and hence no finding of
market power), few have done so by considering brand issues.
211. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
212. Id. at 325.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. The current version of the guidelines is set forth in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED.
TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (Aug. 2010), available at
http://ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf
[hereinafter
HORIZONTAL
MERGER
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adopted by numerous lower courts as the appropriate methodology
for market definition in merger cases.216
The current version of the guidelines state:
The hypothetical monopolist test requires that a product market
contain enough substitute products so that it could be subject to
post-merger exercise of market power significantly exceeding that
existing absent the merger. Specifically, the test requires that a
hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not subject to price
regulation, that was the only present and future seller of those
products (“hypothetical monopolist”) likely would impose at least a
small but significant and non-transitory increase in price (“SSNIP”)
on at least one product in the market, including at least one
product sold by one of the merging firms. For the purpose of
analyzing this issue, the terms of sale of products outside the
candidate market are held constant. The SSNIP is employed solely
as a methodological tool for performing the hypothetical
monopolist test; it is not a tolerance level for price increases
resulting from a merger.217

The “small but significant and nontransitory” increase in price in
the Guidelines is generally referred as the SSNIP test and normally
utilizes a hypothetical 5% price increase to determine the parameters
218
of the relevant product and geographic market. It has been widely
adopted by other leading competition regimes for their own merger
219
analysis processes. Smaller market definitions are used when the
agencies can show that the merging firms will be able to effectively

GUIDELINES]. See also FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER INVESTIGATION DATA,
FISCAL YEARS 1996–2007 (2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/12/
081201hsrmergerdata.pdf.
216. See, e.g., FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008); FTC
v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001); FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186
F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal.
2004); FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D.D.C. 2000). The Supreme Court has
not had an opportunity to weigh in on this issue since the guidelines were drafted.
217. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 215, § 4.1.1 (footnote omitted).
218. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 215, § 4.1.2.
219. Commission, Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers Under the
Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J.
(C31) 5, 6 at ¶ 10 [hereinafter EC Merger Guidelines] (incorporating by reference the
Commission’s separate 1997 Market Definition Notice (1997 O.J. (C372) 5); Competition
Bureau, Merger Enforcement Guidelines (2004) (Can.) ¶ 3.4, available at
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/epic/site/ cb-bc.nsf/en/01245e.html [hereinafter
Canadian Guidelines].
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price discriminate and effectively raise price against a sub-set of its
customers within the relevant market.220
The economics literature suggests another test for market power.
The Lerner index relies on the ratio of price over price minus
marginal cost.221 The Lerner index reflects the notion that the higher
the ratio, the greater degree of monopoly power, reflecting the
ability of the monopolist to increase price above the limits in a
perfectly competitive market.222 The Lerner curve is thus a measure
of the firm’s own price elasticity rather than the cross-elasticity of
demand with other products.
An excellent hypothetical from Professor Glynn Lunney shows
how none of these approaches to market definition, particularly the
SSNIP test, works in a world of brands.223 Professor Lunney posits a
student lounge with a vending machine selling Coke soft drinks and
one immediately next to it selling the equivalent Pepsi products. As
one might expect, raising or lowering the price of soda even more
than the 5% used in the standard version of the SSNIP test is unlikely
to move a substantial proportion of loyal Coke drinkers over to the
Pepsi machine or vice-versa.224
As Professor Lunney concludes:
If we were to extend this type of pricing analysis to other products,
we would almost certainly find that many popular brands do
possess sufficient brand loyalty to constitute distinct product
markets. To the extent a protected trademark serves as the device
for capturing such brand loyalty, even narrow trademark protection
will quite often prohibit competitors from marketing a product that
consumers will recognize and accept as a perfect or even reasonable
substitute for the popular brand.225

This common sense proposition is borne out by the very existence of
brands. Without contending that this is in fact the case, if cigarette
smokers of a particular brand would “rather fight than switch” then
there is no reasonably effective substitute for that brand and the

220. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 215, § 4.1.4.
221. A.P. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1
REV. ECON. STUD. 157, 169 (1934).
222. Id.
223. Lunney, supra note 144, at 424–25.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 426–27 (citation omitted).
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relevant market is that brand of cigarettes.226 Again, if it is literally
true (as opposed to a catchy slogan) that “nothing Runs like a
Deere” then your market definition exercise is complete for the type
of farm equipment you are examining for antitrust purposes.227 At a
more technical level, scholars have analyzed the effect of branding on
internet price comparison sites and have shown that successful retail
branding can maintain price disparities on identical electronic goods
even though lower prices for the same item are at most one mouse
click away.228
In addition, once one considers the role of price discrimination,
the need to consider brands increases. The Merger Guidelines also
state that the ability to price discriminate may be evidence of a
smaller market definition than might otherwise be the case.229 The
2006 Commentary to the Merger Guidelines points out several
instances where the ability to price discriminate has been the basis for
government enforcement action.230 The current chief economists for
both enforcement agencies also have noted the importance of this
concept in their scholarly writings and rely on price discrimination to
establish relatively narrow market definitions when courts are
reluctant to accept direct proof of anticompetitive unilateral
effects.231
Yet, what is noticeably missing is the role of brand management
in establishing the ability to price discriminate. As discussed above,
brand management can be a critical element in facilitating price
discrimination in important, but underappreciated, ways for market
definition purposes. The very purpose of branding is to allow a
company to charge higher prices compared to unbranded or
commodity goods. The same producer may thus manufacture a
branded item for a significant premium, a house (or private label)
brand of the same item at a lesser price, and where necessary the bulk
form of the item at prevailing market prices.232 More generally, the
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 427–29.
Id. at 409 n.161.
See Baye & Morgan, supra note 71, passim.
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 215, § 4.1.4.
Commentary to the Merger Guidelines, supra note 193, at 7–9.
Gregory K. Leonard & Mario A. Lopez, Farrell and Shapiro: The Sequel,
ANTITRUST, Summer 2009, at 14, 17.
232. See generally PRIVATE LABELS, BRANDS, AND COMPETITION POLICY: THE
CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF RETAIL COMPETITION (Ariel Ezrachi & Ulf Bernitz eds., 2009)
(providing a detailed overview of the competitive and intellectual property issues raised by
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branded segment of a market will typically enjoy a substantial
premium over the unbranded segment even when produced by
different manufacturers. This can even be the case in agricultural
goods, the ultimate commodity goods for most purposes.233
Even when market power is recognized as a function of brands,
courts and commentators misunderstand how the brands and market
definition interact. For example, when an accepted market definition
test is applied and shows the market power of a successful brand, the
market power is often dismissed as either trivial or irrelevant for
antitrust purposes.234 As the Seventh Circuit noted in a recent case:
What is true is that a firm selling under conditions of “monopolistic
competition”—the situation in which minor product differences (or
private brands in Europe and the U.S.); John A. Quelch & David Harding, Brands versus
Private Labels: Fighting to Win, in HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW ON BRAND MANAGEMENT 23
(1999).
233. Dermot J, Hayes, Sergio H. Lence & Andrea Stoppa, Farmer-Owned Brands? 20
AGRIBUSINESS 269, 270 (2004). A second type of de facto price discrimination that has
received virtually no attention is what we will term intra-brand price discrimination. Most
brands of consumer goods will strive to offer a series of sub-brands to further segment
purchasers along different price and style points. We recognize that such further product
differentiation is not price discrimination within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act as it
normally does not involve differential pricing of the same commodity. Nonetheless we contend
that such price discrimination is critical to understanding branding and its relevance to market
definition and antitrust policy more generally. Thus, the Armani fashion line has couture, black
label, white label, Le Collezioni, Emporio Armani, and Armani A/X in roughly descending
order of price. Similarly, Marc Jacobs has one line for the highest end of his products and the
Marc line as a starter line for younger or more price-conscious consumers. Certain fashion
houses use a different strategy of creating entirely separate brands under the same corporate
family to slice and dice demand along every conceivable price and style distinction.
234. Daniel J. Gifford, Farewell to the Robinson-Patman Act? The Antitrust
Modernization Commission’s Report and Recommendation, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 481, 485
(2008) (classifying the “‘power’ possessed by the seller of a product differentiated by brand
name” as “often trivial”); Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis After
Kodak, 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 72 (1993) (arguing that “no court would conclude that
the manufacturers of [branded products] possess[] market power” based on the existence of
“significant pricing discretion”); Landes & Posner, supra note 192, at 956–57 (rejecting
Telser’s analysis of own elasticity of branded consumer goods as irrelevant to market power for
antitrust analysis); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 274–75 (1987); Einer Elhauge, Defining Better
Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 260 (2003) (noting that Landes and Posner
would “recoil” from the suggestion that price discrimination due to branding indicates
monopoly power); Schmalensee, supra note 196, at 1015–16 (arguing that ReaLemon, other
brands of reconstituted lemon juice, and fresh lemon juice are all imperfect substitutes, but
rejecting meaningful long term market power for Realemon in any of the potential relevant
markets); Katarzyna A. Czapracka, Where Antitrust Ends and IP Begins – on the Roots of the
Transatlantic Clashes, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 44, 53 (2007) (even if IP allows price above
marginal cost, there are huge sunk costs in development).
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the kind of locational advantage that a local store, such as a barber
shop, might enjoy in competing for some customers) limit the
substitutability of otherwise very similar products—will want to
trademark its brand in order to distinguish it from its competitors’
brands. But the exploitation of the slight monopoly power thereby
enabled does not do enough harm to the economy to warrant
trundling out the heavy artillery of federal antitrust law.235

The “slight” market power conferred by a location advantage in a
particular neighborhood that the court mocks says nothing,
however, about the more real market power that a successful brand
can confer.
Sometimes, the criticism of markets defined by significant brand
power is simply contradictory. As one commentator states:
[W]here differentiation is significant among an array of products,
many products that are interchangeable will not have a high degree
of cross-elasticity of demand with other substitutes or may have
none at all.236

The problem with this line of analysis is, of course, that if the
products do not have a significant degree of cross-elasticity then they
should not be considered substitutes in the first place, despite physical
or functional similarities. This line of reasoning trivializes a
sophisticated branding industry whose entire purpose is to reduce or
eliminate the substitutability of intuitively competing products or
services. In simplest terms, when branding strategies are successful,
that success should be recognized rather than ignored, or assumed
away.
Those proceeding from a trademark perspective err as well. Too
often, those who do take the power of trademarks seriously err in the
other direction and often assert that trademarks frequently or
inevitably constitute monopolies. Even the work in this field which is
more sophisticated is rarely being done by antitrust specialists and
has not had a major impact in the competition law field.237 Much of
235. Sheridan v. Marathon Petrol. Co., 530 F.3d 590, 595 (7th Cir. 2008).
236. James A. Keyte, Market Definition and Differentiated Products: The Need for a
Workable Standard, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 697, 702 (1995) (ultimately arguing for 20% or more
version of SSNP test for differentiated products).
237. See Chad J. Doellinger, A New Theory of Trademarks, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 823
(2007) (arguing that “trademark law provides a normative code of proper business conduct”);
Lunney, supra note 144; Doris Estelle Long, Is Fame All There Is? Beating Global Monopolists
at their Own Marketing Game, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 123 (2008).
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this work is also focused more narrowly on trademark law and not on
the broader concept of the brand.238
To be clear, engaging with brands as part of market definition
analysis does not mean that each brand is its own market for antitrust
purposes or that the existence of a successful brand automatically
constitutes proof of monopoly power. But taking brands seriously
calls into question whether antitrust is ignoring the central reality of
modern business practice in judging the competitive impact of those
practices.239
Nor is this an excuse for lazy lawyering. Courts are correct to
reject facile shortcuts where market power based on the presence of
brands is asserted but not proved. For example, it is hard to argue
with a decision that declines to take judicial notice of the “fact” that
Splenda-brand artificial sweetener is a separate market unto itself.240
An attempt to prove that Marathon brand gasoline had market
power in the gasoline or credit card market based solely on
submission of volume of sales and number of dealers also seems
appropriately doomed to failure.241 Similarly, most attempts to prove
that franchise systems are their own markets will be problematic,
particularly if viewed ex ante in a broader market of similarly branded
franchise opportunities.242 In short, mere invocation of the existence
of brand power without rigorous proof is insufficient and not what
we advocate.
If one takes the notion of brands and branding seriously,
however, there will be instances where a single brand of a product or
service is the relevant market, even if there are physically identical or
similar alternatives. The so-called cellophane fallacy may be an
indirect recognition of just this reality.243 The courts and agencies
must look beyond the physical similarities and focus on whether the
branding campaign has been successful enough so that consumers do
238. Long, supra note 237.
239. It also calls into question the core notion of inter-brand competition if product
differentiation strategies are successful or most market participants employ similar branding
strategies.
240. Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int’l, Inc., No. CV407-42, 2008 WL
2811940, at *3 (S.D. Ga. July 21, 2008).
241. Sheridan v. Marathon Petrol. Co., 530 F.3d 590, 594–95 (7th Cir. 2008).
242. Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 487–88 (5th Cir.
1984) (rejecting market of Holiday Inn franchises); Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle House,
Inc., 734 F.2d 705, 713 (11th Cir. 1984) (no market for Waffle House franchise system). See
generally Keyte, supra note 236, at 697 n.3 (collecting cases).
243. See supra notes 205–10 and accompanying text.
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not view the possible alternatives as reasonably effective
substitutes.244 This can also be true even when the brand is not
accompanied by a registered trademark.245
2. Brands and proof of anticompetitive harm
The prediction of anticompetitive harm in merger cases is the
closest that antitrust comes to the effective recognition of the unique
role of brands. Following the definition of the relevant market and
the measurement of the market share of the merging firms, the
government or private plaintiff must show that the transaction is
likely to produce a “substantial lessening of competition” or a
tendency to create a monopoly.246
There are two theories of competitive harm in merger cases. The
first, coordinated effects theory, is only rarely relevant to brand
issues.247 Coordinated effects theories of harm focus on whether the
merger will raise the likelihood of collusion or oligopolistic
interdependency as a result of changes in the structure of the
market.248 It is the most traditional of merger theories and focuses on
the change in the market share of the merging firm, the increase in
the concentration of the industry, and whether these changes will
make it more likely that the merging firms will take the behavior of
the remaining firms into account and limit their competitive zeal.249
In contrast, unilateral effects (or non-coordinated effects)
theories of harm focus on the effect of the merger regardless of the
behavior of other firms.250 Harm from unilateral effects can be shown
244. U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 997–98 (11th Cir. 1993),
(explaining the dominant brand of anchors is the relevant product market because of consumer
perception and behavior that competing makes and models of anchors are not effective
substitutes).
245. Vitale v. Marlborough Gallery, No. 93 Civ. (PKL) 6276, 1994 WL 654494, at *3–4
(S.D.N.Y. July 5, 1994) (showing Jackson Pollack sub-market as example of powerful brand
without trademark).
246. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1996).
247. Council Regulation 31/03, Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers
Under the Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004
O.J. (C 31/5) § IV.22 [hereinafter EU Merger Guidelines].
248. Id. § IV.39.
249. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 215, § 7. The FTC did challenge
the Diageo-Vivendi merger in the liquor industry on the grounds that the consolidation of the
brands of rum caused by the merger would make coordination more likely with Seagrams, the
remaining important player in the market. Diageo plc, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,896 (FTC Dec. 27,
2001).
250. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 215, § 6. See also EU Merger
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at far less than near-monopoly market shares in markets with more
differentiated products—precisely the type of markets where brands
are likely to be involved.251 Mergers at relatively low market share
levels can be barred on this theory when the government or private
plaintiff can prove that customers view the merging firms as the
closest substitutes to each other.252 If no other firm is viewed as a
close substitute, this would allow the merging firms to raise price or
limit output and capture more profits than they would lose through
customers migrating to weak substitutes.253 In its strongest form,
proponents of the unilateral effects theory suggest that proof of likely
anticompetitive harm can be shown directly through proof of low
customer loss without the indirect proxy of proof of market
definition and market share.254
The most detailed treatment of unilateral effects comes in the
scholarly literature and the commentary on the merger guidelines. In
the merger commentary, the role of branding in product
differentiation and segmenting of markets between different levels of
brands has played a more significant role.
The older General Mills-Pillsbury merger involving flour is of
importance because of the commodity nature of business.255 The key
to understanding the competitive harm alleged by the government
lies in the success of these two firms in creating effective brands for
what was otherwise a functionally equivalent baking product.
Because of the branding, neither unbranded flour nor the imperfect
Guidelines, supra note 247, ¶ 36 (discussing role of brands in EU version of unilateral effects
theory of competitive harm). See generally Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Analyzing Horizontal
Mergers: Unilateral Effects in Product-Differentiated Markets, U. Iowa Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 09–12 (March 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1359288.
251. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 215, § 6.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement,
in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 235 (Robert Pitofsky, ed., 2008); Jonathan B.
Baker & David Reitman, Research Topics in Unilateral Effects Analysis (American University
Washington College of Law Research Paper No. 2009-37), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=1504863. However, courts have been
suspicious when the government’s proof of harm under any theory has not also been
accompanied by traditional market definition. F.T.C. v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548 F.3d
1028, 1036 (D.C. Cir 2008); United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1110
(N.D. Cal. 2004).
255. General Mills Inc./Diageo PLC/Pillsbury Co., F.T.C. file No. 001-0213, available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/10/index.shtm#23.
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substitute of certain regional brands were predicted to be an effective
constraint on the merged companies’ ability to raise prices and the
merger was permitted subject to divestiture of Pillsbury’s baking
products line.256
The merger commentary also discusses the 1996 merger between
Kimberly Clark and Scott as likely to produce anticompetitive harm
for consumers of tissue paper and baby wipes on a similar theory.257
In another example, the Federal Trade Commission challenged a
merger between Dreyer and Nestlé in a market they defined as
“superpremium ice cream.”258 In these cases, there were a large
number of potential suppliers of functionally interchangeable, and
often physically identical, substitutes. That fact would indicate that
courts would not be concerned with such mergers. Yet, when the
FTC considered the power of successful branding, they had a
meaningful, accurate basis for being concerned about the
transaction.
Nonetheless, the unilateral effects theory has not proved to be a
fully viable entry point for brand management into antitrust theory
and practice.259 It remains the more controversial of two different
theories in merger law, which is merely one of the important
segments of antitrust practice. In addition, it has become highly
technical and has lost sight of the importance of product
differentiation and branding which gave birth to the theory in the
first place.260 Despite these limitations, unilateral effects analysis is
not always blind to the power of brand in market definition and does
focus directly on the likely harms of product differentiation.261 It
addresses the vital question of the closeness of the available
substitutes and avoids the artificial line drawing common to
traditional market definition.262 It also suggests that harm to
competition may occur at market shares not normally defined as
256. Id.
257. Commentary to the Merger Guidelines, supra note 193, at 29–30.
258. Id. at 28–29. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 68 Fed. Reg. 39,564, 39,565 (July 2, 2003).
But see In re Super Premium Ice Cream Distrib. Antitrust Litig., 691 F. Supp. 1262, 1268
(N.D. Cal. 1988) (indicating no separate market for superpremium ice cream, just a
continuum of price and quality).
259 See, e.g., Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098; State v. Kraft General Foods, 926 F.
Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). But see HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 215, § 6
(expanding treatment of unilateral effects).
260. Hovenkamp, supra note 250.
261. Id. at 19–20.
262. Id. at 23–24.
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potentially anticompetitive.263 Here antitrust begins to appreciate the
central insight of brand management. When successful branding
generates sufficient customer loyalty, customers simply do not regard
other products as reasonably effective substitutes and are unwilling
to switch.264
3. Brands, entry barriers, and remedies
Brands are quite important at a later stage in antitrust analysis.
Once the relevant markets are defined, power within those markets is
measured, and anticompetitive harm is shown to be likely, the
agency or court will normally proceed with an analysis of barriers to
entry.265 If barriers to entry are low, then the firms are presumed to
lack the ability to raise price or restrict entry and the merger is
normally allowed.266
It has long been recognized that the possession of a strong brand
or brands by the merging firms can constitute a barrier to entry.267 If
the presence of strong branding (or any other factor) would prevent
timely and effective entry at pre-merger prices then the Merger
Guidelines and the Commentary will deem there to be substantial
barriers to entry and continue on to later steps in the merger
analysis.268
The EU Merger Guidelines also state brands and patents may
create entry barriers:
[I]ncumbents may . . . enjoy technical advantages, such as
preferential access to essential facilities, natural resources,
innovation and R & D, or intellectual property rights . . . . In
particular, it may be difficult to enter a particular industry because
263. Id. at 18–20.
264. Id. at 22 (citations omitted).
265. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 215, § 9.
266. Id.
267. Commentary to the Merger Guidelines, supra note 193, at 38–39. (addressing the
likelihood of entry). See generally F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 600 (3d ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 1990);
DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 609
(1990).
268. Czapracka, supra note 234, at 53; HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note
215, §§ 3.0–3.3. Commentary to the Merger Guidelines, supra note 193, at 38, 45. In
addition, the presence or absence of strong brands can be a factor in determining whether a
firm is deemed a rapid entrant, one whose ability to enter is so timely and effective that it
should be considered a current participant in the relevant market. HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 215, § 5.1.
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experience or reputation is necessary to compete effectively, both of
which may be difficult to obtain as an entrant. Factors such as
consumer loyalty to a particular brand, the closeness of
relationships between suppliers and customers, the importance of
promotion or advertising, or other advantages relating to
reputation will be taken into account in this context.269

Conversely, the U.S. Merger Commentary also suggests that if
competing producers can reposition their existing brands then this
will also be considered as an alternative to entry, determining
whether the merger is likely to pose a threat to competition.270 The
reference to repositioning brands is one small example of the need to
better understand the brand literature. The business literature on
branding discusses in considerable detail why brand repositioning in
the sense used by the Merger Guidelines is virtually impossible.271
Brand repositioning normally refers to moving a brand either
upwards or down in the minds of consumer.272 Both are difficult and
problematic for different reasons. David Aaker notes:
Straightforward repositioning from a mainstream or value market
into an upscale one is nearly impossible. A mainstream brand
simply lacks the upscale associations—such as user image, brand
personality, and perceived quality—that are necessary to convince
customers that the product or service should command a premium
price.273

Moving a brand from a premium position to a mainstream or
value brand is easier, but creates such significant risks that it is rarely
worth doing.274 The principal risk is forfeiting the price premium that
having a premium brand allows in the first place.275 The price
reductions normally involved in such a move are extremely costly in
both the short term and the long term and risk turning a branded,
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

EU Merger Guidelines, supra note 247, § VI.71.
Commentary to the Merger Guidelines, supra note 193, at 31.
Aaker, supra note 69, at 136.
Id.
Id. at 142. See also DARYL TRAVIS, EMOTIONAL BRANDING: HOW SUCCESSFUL
BRANDS GAIN THE IRRATIONAL EDGE 18 (2000) (“When a brand is first being introduced,
there is a short period of time when marketers can influence its positioning. But after that,
consumers decide what it means, and once they’ve decided, they don’t like to change it.”);
DAVID A. AAKER, MANAGING BRAND EQUITY 122 (1991) (“upgrading a brand can be
tricky”).
274. Aaker, supra note 69, at 137.
275. Id.
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differentiated product or service back into a commodity.276 Price
reductions normally are a signal that the product has become an
entirely different kind of brand.277 Taken to an extreme, this is
referred to as the “branding doom loop.”278
As a result, most brand strategists suggest creating sub-brands
where a new product or service is offered rather than changing the
core brand products or services themselves.279 A frequent example is
Courtyards by Marriott which allowed Marriott to enter a lower
priced segment of the hotel industry, draw on the positive aspects of
the Marriott brand, without damaging the core portion of Marriott’s
more upscale hotel. These strategies can be successful if done
correctly, but to call this repositioning in the sense used by the
Guidelines is a misnomer. Rather than repositioning an existing
brand, companies normally create a new sub-brand to enter a
different slice of the market.280 This is simply new entry, rather than
brand repositioning, and already adequately covered by the existing
Guidelines.281
On the remedy side, brands have played an important role in
deciding what to do about a transaction once the Agencies conclude
that it represents a substantial risk to competition. The Agencies will
work with the parties before proceeding to court to address areas of
concern if the threat to competition can be remedied through partial
divestitures, rather than a challenge to the entire transaction.282 In
this situation, numerous challenges to mergers have been resolved
through the divestiture of assets which have consisted of, or
included, competing brands so that the post-merger market will
consist of the same number of viable competitors as before.283
276. Id.
277. DAVID A. AAKER, BUILDING STRONG BRANDS 281–82 (1996) (citing Marlboro and
Schlitz price cutting strategies as examples).
278. Tim Calkins, The Challenge of Branding, in KELLOGG ON BRANDING: THE
MARKETING FACULTY OF THE KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 1, 5 (Alice M. Tybort &
Tim Calkins eds., 2005).
279. See Aaker, supra note 69, at 140–41; Regina Fazio Maruca, How do you grow a
Premium Brand?, 73 HARV. BUS. REV. 22, 26 (Mar.–Apr. 1995).
280. David A. Aaker, Should You Take Your Brand to Where the Action Is?, in HARVARD
BUSINESS REVIEW ON BRAND MANAGEMENT 79 (1999).
281. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 215, § 9.
282. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, 30–31
(2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf.
283. Commentary to the Merger Guidelines, supra note 193, at 38. Similarly, the
divestiture or licensing of brands has been a condition of EU approval of a number of mergers.
See, e.g., Case T-114/02, Babyliss v. Comm’n, 2003 ECR II-000, ¶ 176 (stating approval of
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4. The red herring of after-markets
Ironically, the one place where the role of single market brands
has been debated most vigorously turns out to be the ultimate red
herring. A line of cases addresses whether a firm can exploit the
aftermarket for parts or services of its own product. The most famous
case is the 1992 Kodak case.284 Kodak was accused of unlawful tying
and monopolization of the market for parts and service for its brand
of photocopiers.285 In the market for original photocopying
equipment, Kodak was a small player with no significant share of the
market.286 Initially customers who purchased a Kodak copier could
service it through Kodak or through independent service operators
(“ISOs”) who purchased replacement parts from Kodak.287 Kodak
subsequently changed this policy and refused to sell parts to such
ISOs or even to the customers themselves unless they self-serviced.288
This had the effect of requiring most customers to get both their
replacement parts and their service from Kodak at higher prices.289
An independent service operator sued alleging that the change in
policy constituted both unlawful monopolization under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act and unlawful tying under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.290 Kodak moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it
lacked the necessary market power prerequisite to liability under
either of the plaintiff’s theories.291 Kodak argued because it lacked
market power in the original copier equipment market, as a matter of
law it lacked power over replacement parts or service for such
equipment.292
The Supreme Court held that there were material questions of
fact whether or not Kodak enjoyed market power over the parts and
merger of small kitchen appliance makers on condition of five year exclusive trademark license);
Coca-cola Bottling Co. v. FTC 85 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 1996); cf. Commission Decision (EC)
98/327 in Case IV/M.833, The Coca-Cola Company/Carlsberg A/S, 1998 O.J. (L 145) ¶¶
72-73, 110, 118 (permitting soft drink merger reducing international brands from four to
three upon condition of divestiture of brand and assets).
284. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
285. Id. at 456.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 458.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 459.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 470.
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service for its own copiers and reversed the grant of summary
judgment.293 The defendant had offered evidence that customers
could factor in parts and service along with the original purchase
price of the equipment and life cycle price.294 The defendants argued
that any attempt to raise any component of the life cycle price would
be unsuccessful given Kodak’s small share of the equipment
market.295 In contrast, the plaintiff introduced evidence that
purchasers’ buying decisions did not work in this manner for a
variety of reasons including actual purchasing policies, lock-in effects,
and switching costs.296
The decision produced a dissent by Justice Scalia who argued:
The Court today finds in the typical manufacturer’s inherent power
over its own brand of equipment—over the sale of distinctive repair
parts for that equipment, for example—the sort of “monopoly
power” sufficient to bring the sledgehammer of § 2 into play. . . .
In my opinion, this makes no economic sense. The holding that
market power can be found on the present record causes these
venerable rules of selective proscription to extend well beyond the
point where the reasoning that supports them leaves off. Moreover,
because the sort of power condemned by the Court today is
possessed by every manufacturer of durable goods with distinctive
parts, the Court’s opinion threatens to release a torrent of litigation
and a flood of commercial intimidation that will do much more
harm than good to enforcement of the antitrust laws and to
genuine competition.297

The aftermath of Kodak produced little of the torrent of litigation
298
predicted by Justice Scalia but did produce a vigorous debate in
literature about the validity of after-markets and single market
brands.299 Whether lock-in theories and related after-market claims
293. Id. at 477.
294. Id. at 459.
295. Id. at 464.
296. Id. at 496–97.
297. Id. at 489 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
298. But see Hilti AG v. Comm’n, Case T-30/89, 1991 E.C.R. II-1439, 1992 4
C.M.L.R. 16 (Ct. First Instance).
299. Compare Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Aftermarkets, 17 MANAGERIAL &
DECISION ECON. 143, 157 (1996); Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust, Economic
Analysis After Kodak, 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43 (1993); Thomas Arthur, The Costly Quest for
Perfect Competition: Kodak and Nonstructural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 60–71
(1994), with Eleanor M. Fox, Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical Services, Inc. –
Information Failure as Soul or Hook?, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 759 (1993–1994); Joseph Kattan,
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should be recognized has nothing to do with brand power and
everything to do with contractual opportunism.300 The Kodak brand
has nothing to do with whether the defendant should be held liable
to its customers or competitors for its policies with respect to
replacement parts and services. What commentators are really
debating is the validity and importance of after-markets as the proper
level of analysis for such antitrust claims and not whether the brand
defines the market.301
The controversies surrounding Kodak and its progeny in the
United States and the EU have tarred more legitimate questions of
how brands shape definitions of markets, power, and liability and
unhelpfully suggested that these are “single brand” cases.302 Instead
they speak to whether the market in a particular case (whether there
are powerful brands, weak brands, or no brands at all) should be
defined at the original equipment stage or the downstream parts and
service stage for those who are already customers. It also raises issues
regarding whether someone can service a product or tinker with it in
whatever manner they wish. If one considers the culture and societal
benefits of car and computer improvements, the idea that a company
can prevent someone from tinkering with technology in any form
presents important issues regarding innovation and control. But
these issues shed no light on the questions we are seeking to explore
about the nature of brands and the power they may confer in
business competition.
5. Antitrust as enabler of brands: vertical restraints and resale
maintenance
As shown above, manufacturers have used brands to control
price and extract value that may otherwise go to a wholesaler or
Market Power in the Presence of an Installed Base, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (1993–1994); Mark R.
Patterson, Product Definition, Product Information, and Market Power, 73 N.C. L. REV. 185
(1994–1995); Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Theory and Fact in Antitrust Doctrine: Summary Judgment
Standards, Single-Brand Aftermarkets and the Clash of Microeconomic Models, 45 ANTITRUST
BULL. 887 (2000).
300. See Warren S. Grimes, Brand Marketing, Intrabrand Competition, and the
Multibrand Retailer: The Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 83, 88,121
(1995–1996).
301. Compare Klein, supra note 299, at 43; Arthur, supra note 299, at 887; Patterson,
supra note 299, at 185; Fox, supra note 299, at 759; Kattan, supra note 299, at 1.
302. James A. Keyte, Market Definition and Differentiated Products: The Need for a
Workable Standard, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 697, 705–06 (1994–1995).
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retailer or be retained by the consumer. In antitrust terms, this
relates to the issue of vertical restraints, which addresses the
relationship among manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers. Vertical
restraints are imposed by a manufacturer on someone “down” the
distribution chain such as a wholesaler or distributor, or between a
wholesaler/distributor and a retailer. The restraints can involve price
terms, which are referred to as resale price maintenance, or non-price
terms such as the location, territories, or customers that a wholesaler,
distributor, or retailer can serve. Antitrust has trended toward a
permissive case-by-case rule of reason review of such restraints and
away from per se rules barring such practices. A largely unobserved
result of this trend has been that antitrust law has become the
ultimate enabler of the growth of brands as a marketing strategy.303
The seminal case in this regard, Sylvania, was premised on the
importance of inter-brand competition, which is arguably an
oxymoron, for any powerful successful brand by definition seeks to
be its own category and face no competition.304 Sylvania was decided
against a complicated and rapidly evolving antitrust landscape for
vertical non-price restraints.305 In 1963, the Supreme Court declined
to impose a per se rule against such restraints in White Motors.306 Yet
four years later, in Schwinn, the court held that non-price vertical
restraints which forbade the retailer to sell bicycles outside a certain
geographic territory were per se illegal if title had passed from the
manufacturer to the bicycle dealer.307 If title had not passed and the
dealer was acting as the agent or consignee of the manufacturer, the
restraints were subject to the rule of reason.308
Ten years later, the Court reversed itself and established a broad
rule of reason analysis for all vertical non-price restraints. Sylvania
itself concerned the efforts of a small market share television
manufacturer to restructure its distribution system to stay alive and
attempt to regain market share. To do so, the defendant established
location and territorial restraints for its dealers and terminated a
Northern California dealer who did not abide by those restrictions.309
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

See Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
Id. at 51–52.
Id. at 53 n.21.
White Motor Co. v. U.S., 372 U.S. 253, 261–62 (1963).
U. S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 373–75 (1967).
Id. at 380–82.
G.T.E. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 38–40.
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The Sylvania court began with the unsupported proposition that
inter-brand competition was “the primary concern of antitrust
law.”310 It then reasoned that certain restrictions on intra-brand
competition (consumers’ ability to shop at different dealers for the
same brand) were necessary to promote inter-brand competition.311
The court noted that restrictions on intra-brand competition might
also create incentives for dealers to promote a given brand and
would prevent one dealer from free riding off the promotional efforts
of another.312 In the court’s view, non-price vertical restraints could
promote inter-brand competition more than it restricted intra-brand
competition.313 Such restraints were unlikely to harm consumers if
the manufacturer imposing the restriction lacked significant market
power.314 The court concluded that a broad rule of reason was the
appropriate standard to weigh the antitrust consequences of such
restrictions regardless of the common law property concepts of title
ownership and risk of loss.315
Missing from this analysis is any assessment of brand strength
and product differentiation. We are not the first to note that the
relationship between inter-brand and intra-brand is far more
complex than the court acknowledges in Sylvania and its progeny.
As Professor Grimes notes in his seminal article on Sylvania:
The Court was on solid ground when it found that vertical
restraints can provide an effective tool for promoting a producer
brand. But the Court’s assertion that interbrand competition
provides “a significant check on the exploitation of intrabrand
market power” fails to recognize that the brand promotion
associated with vertical restraints tends to increase brand
differentiation and that increased brand differentiation means lower
demand elasticity, and hence greater market power. To put it
another way, the more effective a vertical restraint is in
differentiating a brand, the greater the reduction in interbrand
competition.316

310. Id. at 52 n.19.
311. Id. at 54–55.
312. Id. at 55.
313. Id. at 65 (White, J., concurring).
314. Id. at 52, n.19 (majority opinion).
315. Id. at 57–58.
316. Grimes, Brand Marketing, supra note 195, at 96 (citations omitted); see also Robert
L. Steiner, The Inverse Association Between the Margins of Manufacturers and Retailers, 8 REV.
INDUS. ORG. 717 (1993) (arguing that strong advertised brands increase manufacturer’s
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There are numerous examples of the concerns raised by Professor
Grimes. Products like the Apple computer, the iPod, high end
bicycles, golf clubs, luggage, electronics, and a number of luxury and
status goods have been subject to an increasing array of vertical price
and non-price restraints.317 While free riding and other traditional
justifications for resale price maintenance (“RPM”) and non-price
vertical restraints may be present to varying degrees for some of these
items, such concerns are not uniformly applicable or necessarily
significant.318 What is present across the board is the perceived need
to build an effective branding strategy with the goal of consumers
who no longer recognize other potential functional substitutes as
effective substitutes.319 As Professor Grimes notes, at some point the
vertical restraints reduce both intra- and inter-brand competition.320
Equally important, they increase the power and value of the brand in
question.321
The most recent example of this line of simplistic thinking is the
2007 Leegin decision where the Supreme Court held 5–4 that even
minimum resale price maintenance should be subject to the rule of
reason.322 The court’s decision was based on the same inter-brand
competition and free rider rationale used in Sylvania.323 While the
history of resale price maintenance is longer than that of vertical
non-price restraints, it shows the same disregard of brands in
formulating antitrust policy.324
As far back as 1911, the Supreme Court in Dr. Miles held that
after title had passed from the manufacturer, any attempt to dictate
the minimum price of an item was illegal.325 The Court relied on the
passage of title to reach this conclusion: the vertical price restriction
was an unlawful restraint on alienation.326 The court rejected any
defense based on the limited market position of the defendant or on

margins and prices and decrease retailer’s gross margin).
317. Grimes, Brand Marketing, supra note 195, at 100–06.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 118–19.
320. Id. at 107–13.
321. Id. at 113.
322. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 877 (2007).
323. Id. at 895–96.
324. Id. at 896–98.
325. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911).
326. Id. at 404.
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the presence of trade secrets.327 Although the Court did not speak
specifically in terms of harm to competition, Dr. Miles became the
basis of a per se rule against such restraints that lasted until Leegin.328
The medicine in question was a so-called patent medicine, a
tonic that calmed the nerves, probably through the alcohol that it
contained. Such patent medicines were in fact not patented at all but
secret formulas developed by the manufacturer and sold under
various brand names.329 The patent medicine industry began to rely
on RPM strategies in the late nineteenth century at precisely the
same time as the rise of branding and advertising that facilitated
product differentiation.330
It is not surprising that the Supreme Court did not discuss the
branding aspects of Dr. Miles in formulating its rule. Brand
management was still in its infancy.331 The Court saw the case more
about property rights and the need to limit restrictions on the sale of
products after title had passed.332 This is a concern that modern
intellectual property law addresses, if at all, through the first sale
doctrine.333 It is interesting to note, however, that the per se rule in
Dr. Miles rejects the notion of any property rights remaining with
the manufacturer after sale, despite the presence of a successful
brand.
The severity of the per se rule from Dr. Miles against RPM waxed
and waned for the next century. Almost immediately, the Court held
that Section 1 of the Sherman Act did not apply to unilateral
decisions to terminate a distributor for refusal to adhere to price
levels.334 The focus then shifted to what could be considered an
illegal resale price agreement and what would be considered lawful
unilateral decisions to terminate a dealer or distributor. Courts first
327. Id. at 403–04.
328. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 901–03.
329. See Dr. Miles Med. Co., 220 U.S. at 374. A modern day equivalent may be the secret
formula for Coca-Cola, which is unpatented but arguably the most guarded and valuable trade
secret in the world.
330. Barak Y. Orbach, Antitrust Vertical Myopia: The Allure of High Prices, 50 ARIZ. L.
REV. 261, 262–63 (2008).
331. Id. (citing JAMES D. NORRIS, ADVERTISING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1865–1920 (1990); FRANK PRESBREY, THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF ADVERTISING, 113–445 (1929).
332. See Dr. Miles Med. Co., 220 U.S. at 403–05.
333. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.,
976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
334. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
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expanded when an agreement could be inferred and then tightened
the standard for finding an agreement to impose unlawful resale
prices.335
As to substance of the per se rule from Dr. Miles against RPM,
there was a similar expansion and contraction. The Court first
explained that the Dr. Miles per se rule applied to both maximum
and minimum RPM.336 Then in 1997, the Court, in State Oil v.
Khan, reversed course and held that the rule of reason would apply
to maximum RPM.337
This set the stage for the Leegin case and the sea change
eliminating the per se rule for even minimum RPM agreements. In
Leegin the Court held that because RPM had the potential to
increase inter-brand competition through the elimination of free
riding, case-by-case consideration under the rule of reason was
justified.338 Though the Court acknowledged the potential for RPM
to be used as a facilitating device for either dealer or manufacturer
cartels, it concluded that the rule of reason was flexible enough to
handle these concerns.339 To implement its holding in Leegin, the
Court invited the lower courts to consider different presumptions
and structured forms of the rule of reason as they gained experience
in these cases to streamline review of the competitive consequences
of RPM in different factual settings.340
Throughout the foregoing line of cases, the Supreme Court was
quite literally obsessed with brands without ever seeking to define
what brands were, how they functioned, why they mattered, or the
effects of vertical restraints on the product differentiation critical to
successful branding. As set forth in Table 1, the number of cites to
“brands” “inter-brand” and “intra-brand,” or the total of all three,
in the majority opinions of the Court’s recent decisions addressing
vertical restraints has risen dramatically.341
335. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984); Bergen
Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co. 307 F.2d 725, 727–29 (3d Cir. 1962).
336. Albrecht v. Harold Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152 (1968), overruled by State Oil Co. v.
Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
337. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997).
338. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882, 891–92
(2007).
339. Id. at 897.
340. Id. at 898–99. See generally Christine A. Varney, A Post-Leegin Approach to Resale
Price Maintenance Using a Structured Rule of Reason, 24 ANTITRUST 22 (2009).
341. The trend is even more striking if one omits the State Oil case from the Table. State
Oil dealt with the treatment of maximum resale price maintenance in the retailing of gasoline,
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TABLE 1
Case Name

“Interbrand” “Intrabrand” “Brands” Total

Dr. Miles
(1911)
White Motor
Co. (1963)

0

0

0

0

3

2

3

8

Schwinn
(1967)
GTE Sylvania
(1977)
State Oil
(1997)
Leegin (2007)

2

2

7

11

13

21

3

37

4

1

1

6

15

9

25

49

With this doctrinal evolution, brands have thrown off all antitrust
constraints short of being used as a sham for traditional horizontal
collusion among competitors. First, Leegin only applies where the
manufacturer has parted with title.342 Otherwise, the manufacturer is
free to price at any level it wishes. Furthermore, the Leegin rule only
applies when a manufacturer and a retailer make an explicit
agreement.343 A manufacturer is free to do anything it wishes under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act regarding price if it acts alone.344
The debate over Leegin and RPM generally has also almost
entirely ignored the role of brands. Of the many defenders and critics
of Leegin, Professor Barak Orbach is one of the few commentators
who has noted the centrality of brands to the RPM debate.345 We
wholeheartedly agree with him descriptively, even if we reach
which raised fewer of the brand issues discussed in the other cases on vertical restraints.
342. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 551 U.S. at 898.
343. See id.
344. See Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. at 307.
345. See Orbach, supra note 330, at 266; see also Barak Y. Orbach, The Image Theory:
RPM and the Allure of High Prices, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 277 (2010); cf. 8 PHILIP E. AREEDA
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND
THEIR APPLICATION 324–25 (2d ed. 2004) (arguing that presence of strong brand is factor
favoring treating a particular resale price maintenance agreement as per se unlawful). But see
generally George R. Ackert, An Argument for Exempting Prestige Goods from the Per Se Ban on
Resale Price Maintenance, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1185 (1995) (arguing in terms of prestige goods,
but not directly engaging brands literature).
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different normative conclusions for reasons discussed below. While
the Supreme Court implies that brand image is the primary asset that
should be protected from cradle to grave, and from creation though
consumption, it never explicitly says so. This is a breathtaking
proposition and a dramatic reversal from the historical assertion that
the manufacturer lost all rights upon transfer of title. Now title is
virtually meaningless, and the manufacturer’s property-like interest in
its brand is a strong justification for restrictions on price, marketing,
and use long after the item has been transferred down the chain of
distribution.
It is one thing to say that economics, rather than property law,
will govern antitrust liability. It is another far more troubling thing,
however, to in-effect propertize brands without explicitly saying so
and strip downstream distributors and, potentially, consumers of
their traditional property rights in the items they purchase and
consume. If brands are going to become legal super-property, this
stealth approach is an improper substitute for the robust public
debate that such a dramatic change in the law should require.
Ironically, Leegin was not a particularly compelling case to
empower the brand in this fashion. The defendant in Leegin had only
a middling brand for woman’s purses and belts,346 with no significant
free-rider issues to justify the resale price maintenance scheme in
question. The defendant may not have had significant market power
whether measured traditionally or through a brand lens. But nor did
it have many compelling arguments that the restraints in question
were necessary or even useful in promoting its brand or creating
further product differentiation within its retail category. Regardless
of who should prevail in Leegin or future cases, antitrust will not
have strong tools to deal with these types of issues under the rule of
reason that the Supreme Court has announced without a more
sophisticated understanding of brands and brands management.
V. WHERE BRANDS TAKE US
Our claim is simple. Brands are important tools in business
competition; trademark and antitrust law ought to catch up to this
real-world practice. We have shown that brands are far more
complex and robust than the legal conception of brands as merely
trademarks. In addition, we have shown how both trademark and
346. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 551 U.S. at 882.
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antitrust law have tried to manage brand practices, but only
inadvertently, for neither area appreciated what it was doing. These
blind behaviors enabled brands’ power to grow without asking
whether such increased power was desirable. This paper is a call to
see the importance of brands and to begin to integrate brand
understandings into the law. We close with what we think must
happen for that call to reach its full potential and set forth the
benefits of such a shift.
A. Fixing Trademark and Antitrust Law’s Myopia
So far, brands have eluded both trademark and antitrust law.
Brands do not fit precisely within trademark, and they are not a well
defined antitrust issue. This situation has allowed brands to grow in
importance as part of business practice and strategy while neither
body of law recognizes the importance of brands and misses the way
in which brands affect competition and society. As such,
compromises and limitations that have evolved over time in
trademark and antitrust doctrines as a way to balance the needs of
business and consumers often no longer operate as well or at all.
That change upsets the balance that both areas of the law ought to
maintain as their guiding star of competition policy.
The law must recognize the transcendence of brands. A rich
literature on brands exists and can aid in remedying the law’s brand
blind spot.347 It is obvious that brands matter as a fundamental
business strategy designed to create artificial scarcity, economic rents,
and consumer loyalty and indeed make brands a core aspect of
consumer identity. In other words, brands and the brand literature
provide an important lens for analyzing and formulating legal policy.
Yet, this opportunity has rarely been seized. Both the law of
antitrust and the law of trademarks have either pretended that brands
don’t matter or have discussed them indirectly by filtering this key
business concept through the language of law and economics. For
example, Professor Orbach is correct when he notes that “[t]he
prevalence of RPM in markets for premium-brand goods has never
drawn serious attention in the RPM literature.”348 But he is only
correct with respect to the legal literature and the law and economics
literature on this subject. The marketing and brand management
347. See, e.g., supra notes 23–30.
348. Orbach, supra note 330, at 266.
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literature is replete with discussions on this topic.349 This alternate
body of literature is rarely drawn upon by either the proponents or
the critics of the past or current legal rules on the myriad of business
practices that antitrust and trademark law seek to regulate.
We are not calling for replacing the language of economics with
the language of business literature. Economics is a vital and
important language in the law, but it must be supplemented if we are
to have a coherent legal regime with respect to brands. When law
and economics first entered the legal academy, few had a
background in economics; yet, now, some level of economic analysis
travels with much of legal education.
Today, the legal academy faces a similar problem with brands.
Most lawyers lack formal business or marketing training. Regardless
of formal training, the business literature is challenging. It is large
and often draws on other social science disciplines.350 Some of the
literature is anecdotal or motivational and aimed at a popular
audience of either students or managers in the work force. And, as
with almost any discipline, some of it lacks rigor.
Nonetheless the field of marketing and brand management is a
well-established and respected field with its own serious scholars,
journals, conferences, networks, vocabulary, and other means of
transmission.351 We submit that an understanding of the field is
necessary to understand the concepts of product differentiation,
market segmentation, price discrimination, customer loyalty, and
customer identity that are the heart of modern brand management.
In short, scholars, practitioners, policy makers, legislators, and judges
need to be as familiar with the literature and language of marketing
and brand management as they are with different strands of
economic thought.352
Such a familiarity would likely result in a different language and
vocabulary for both antitrust and trademark law—one that addresses
the realities of how business operates. In antitrust, talk of crosselasticity of demand and own elasticity would probably be replaced
by analysis of “shoppers” or “switcher[s]” versus “loyals.”353 Survey
349. See, e.g., supra notes 33–110 and accompanying text.
350. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 104, at 246–47 (describing seven major scientific
traditions found in brand theory).
351. Id. at 21 (documenting evolution of brand studies as robust and clear enough to
allow for Kuhnian analysis of a paradigm shift in the theoretical approaches to branding).
352. See Waller, Language of Law, supra note 198, at 337–38.
353. GRIFFIN, supra note 201, passim; Baye & Morgan, supra note 71, passim.
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data might be considered instead of or along with regression and
simulation models. The focus would be on how companies compete
to create loyal consumers who will return over and over again to the
same brand or family of brands over their lifetime and trade up to
the higher price, higher profit segments of the brand.354 The
competitive strategic techniques to be analyzed will vary from case to
case but would include brand extensions, increasing switching costs
in different ways, RPM and other restrictions on distribution to
maintain and enhance brand image, bundled discounts, loyalty
rebates, increasing shelf space, and denying these same advantages to
competitors in order to segment the market to the utmost degree
possible. Few if any of these techniques emphasize price competition,
which is the starting point for most economic analysis.
In trademark, the change may be more radical. In some cases,
producer concerns regarding brand equity, the ability to enter new
markets, and free-riding would be considered alongside trademark’s
traditional focus on consumers and the likelihood of confusion.355
Not all changes would favor producers. Whereas trademark doctrine
does a poor job of accommodating consumers’ desires to use marks
for expression, recent brand theory recognizes the dynamic nature of
a brand and that consumers play an important role in shaping the
brand such that complete control of the brand message and meaning
may be unwise and untenable.356 At its most fundamental level, the
very definition of a trademark could expand so that trademark law
would be able to discuss the multi-dimensional nature of brands and
properly address issues beyond source and quality.
A deeper understanding of brands and brand discourse can yield
a better picture of what the law is doing and a metric by which to see
whether those results match the law’s stated foundations. Insofar as
the law champions a brand result, it should do so explicitly and be
better equipped to say so. This, in turn, would permit clear, critical
discussion regarding the normative desirability of such outcomes. In
354. See, e.g., GIORGIO ARMANI, http://www.giorgioarmani.com/ (last visited Oct. 22,
2010); MARC JACOBS, http://www.marcjacobs.com/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2010); POTTERY
BARN, http://www.potterybarn.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2010) (describing families of brands
aimed at different age and income demographics).
355. See McKenna, supra note 7, at 117.
356. See, e.g., HEDING ET AL., supra note 104, at 21, 153–55; Deven R. Desai, A Brand
Theory of Trademarks 52–54, Thomas Jefferson School of Law Research Paper No. 1585327,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1585327; cf. Beebe, supra
note 5, at 630–34 (discussing the semiotic and dyadic nature of trademarks).
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simplest terms, we are in a world where the law fosters cradle to
grave protection for companies’ branded goods and services. The law
must expand its horizons to appreciate what it is doing, articulate
what it is doing, and answer whether it wants to be doing so in some
other manner, if at all.
B. Expanding the Brand Perspective
Parts II and III laid out where theoretical and practical literature
on brands explains certain outcomes in trademark and antitrust
doctrines that are not well-addressed by the doctrine or the law and
economic literature’s understanding of the disciplines. This section
provides examples of where a brand perspective could prove useful to
further studies within the two doctrines.
For example, beyond questions of market definition and merger
guidelines, understanding more about the role of brands can provide
equally important insights into other hot-button issues being
debated in the antitrust field. The courts and enforcement agencies
have split badly over the proper antitrust treatment of different
marketing practices in the branded pharmaceutical industry.357 The
mere fact that the industry is normally referred as the “branded
pharmaceutical industry” suggests that branding is the key to
understanding the competitive significance of such practices as
payments to generic drug manufacturers to delay entry, the creation
and sale of “authorized generics” by the original manufacturer of the
branded medicine in order to blunt the effects of generic entry, the
massive increase in advertising of brand name pharmaceutical
medicines, and many of the more general issues being debated under
the rubric of health care reform. Again this is an area where an
understanding of brands would seem to be central but is missing.
Issues of bundling, bundled discounts, and loyalty rebates are
another contentious area in the antitrust world.358 Most cases and
commentators have sought to analogize these practices to other areas
of antitrust where the legal rules are more clear-cut.359 But once one
357. See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FTC Chairman, Members of Congress Call
for Legislation to End Sweetheart “Pay-for-Delay” Deals That Keep Generic Drugs Off the
Market, (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/01/payfordelay.shtm.
358. Compare, LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc), and
Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895, 905–14 (9th Cir. 2007), amended
by 515 F.3d 883 (3d Cir. 2008).
359. See generally ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 83 (2007) (proposing predatory pricing test for allegations of
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flips the brand switch, it is easy to see the fundamental unity of all
these practices. They are coordinated attempts to recruit and retain
customers and create loyal brand customers through a variety of
different means. What is the appropriate legal rule to deal with these
phenomena? That is a difficult question. Using a brand lens helps ask
the right set of questions directly rather than by analogy.
A full discussion of the numerous ways in which brands can
similarly help better explain current trademark doctrine is beyond the
scope of this Article. As set forth above, initial interest confusion,
post-sale confusion, merchandising rights, and dilution doctrines are
better explained as brand issues rather than trademark ones.360 Other
areas of trademark law could benefit from such analysis as well. For
example, the amount and scope of protection for trade dress
continues to pose problems for trademark law.361 Trade dress is
understood as “the total image of a product and may include
features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture,
graphics, or even particular sales techniques.”362 A brand perspective
would allow a court to see that trade dress can be quite valuable to a
company and that the company invested time and money in
developing that trade dress as part of the company’s branding
strategy. The courts could then better evaluate whether the law
ought to protect trade dress and the grounds for doing so.
Trademark doctrine’s struggle to manage speech interests offers
another area where knowledge of brand literature could prove
useful.363 In the abstract, expressive use of a trademark is not
actionable. Individual uses of marks such as Barbie in artistic
contexts,364 Lego on fan sites,365 and any use in almost any nonanticompetitive bundling); Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts and the Death of the Single
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2009).
360. See supra Part III.C.
361. See, e.g., Lars Smith, Trade Distinctiveness: Solving Scalia’s Tertium Quid Trade Dress
Conundrum, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 243, 252.
362. See Ingrida Karins Berzins, Comment, The Emerging Circuit Split Over Secondary
Meaning in Trade Dress Law, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1661, 1664 (2004).
363. See generally William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV.
49, 52–53, 61–66 (2008) (arguing that should a case reach a court, free speech concerns
usually prevent the plaintiff from recovery but that ambiguous trademark “fair use” doctrines
generate litigation and chill speech).
364. In artistic contexts, expressive uses entail incorporating a trademark into a painting,
sculpture, etc. These uses fall under a different, yet related, issue of the incorporation of a
trademark into art and whether a given use is protected under First Amendment principles. See,
e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 806 (9th Cir. 2003) (artistic
works incorporating and transforming Mattel’s Barbie doll constituted parodic speech
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commercial context is supposed to be permitted. Yet what is an
expressive use of a mark and what constitutes fair use is an unclear
and unstable area of trademark law.366
The dominant view of trademark law as being a private good,367
and as such fully under the control of the mark holder, has led to
dubious litigation tactics by mark holders.368 Brand theory, however,
acknowledges and, as a business matter, encourages businesses to
exploit a simple reality: people use brands in ways that are beyond
source identification and in addition to legal conceptions of
speech.369 At the individual level, brands become part of how
someone creates who they are and represents that self to the
world.370
Brand theory appreciates the community dimension of brands as
well. In this view, a brand community is “a specialized, nongeographically bound community, based on a structured set of social
relationships among admirers of a brand”371 and a given brand
community collectively negotiates with companies regarding the
brand.372 In other words, rather than seeing trademarks as a one-way
information device, brand theory indicates that companies recognize
the two-way nature of a brand and truly engage in negotiation
regarding company practices.373 The brand perspective respects the
protected by the First Amendment).
365. See, e.g., Desai & Rierson, supra note 1, at 1840 (describing the Lego Corporation’s
response to the www.ratemylego.com fan site).
366. See generally McGeveran, supra note 363.
367. See David W. Barnes, A New Economics of Trademarks, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 22, 24, 50–57 (2006) (exploring the tension between private and public goods
conceptions of trademarks).
368. See, e.g., Desai & Rierson, supra note 1, at 1791 (citing K.J. Greene, Abusive
Trademark Litigation and the Incredible Shrinking Confusion Doctrine—Trademark Abuse in
the Context of Entertainment Media and Cyberspace, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 609 (2004);
Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031
(2005)).
369. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 972–73
(1993) (discussing rights of a mark holder when the mark’s “role transcends identifying the
source.”).
370. Cf. id. at 974–75 (noting that because of mark holder’s efforts to make a mark part
of people’s cultural experience and daily language “the mark or symbol or image is no longer
entirely its own, and that in some sense it also belongs to all those other minds who have
received and integrated it”).
371. Albert M. Muniz, Jr. & Thomas C. O’Guinn, Brand Community, 27 J. CONSUMER
RES. 412, 412 (2001).
372. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 104, at 187.
373. See Desai, supra note 356, at 53.
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company’s investment in the brand but has room for expressive uses;
a balance which the law currently struggles to obtain.
All of these controversial issues are different ways of asking what
is the nature of a brand and what is the extent of the legal protection
we as a society wish to offer. A brand perspective may not provide all
the answers. It does, however, ask the right questions for legal and
economic scholars to pursue and take more seriously. In simplest
terms, trademark and antitrust law are protecting and growing
brands and brand power. As a normative matter the law must reorient itself to understand brands and their effects on competition.
From that basis the law can see how the management of brands and
competition ought to be structured.
VI. CONCLUSION
Brands and competition. Brands and the law. Brands,
competition, and the law. Brands may be discussed as part of
competition and business strategy. Brands may be discussed as part
of separate doctrines within the law, but, uncoupling brands,
competition, and the law is a mistake. The three operate together.
Companies use a combination of logos, packaging, advertising,
distribution, and more to fashion a specific brand that functions as a
company’s identity, generates consumer loyalty, and affects the
consumer’s identity and self-image to reinforce that loyalty. The
brand becomes a powerful tool allowing businesses to affect demand,
exert power within supply chains, control price, and more. Rather
than simply functioning as a mark that identifies the source and
quality of a good or service, a brand is a vital, dynamic part of a
company’s competitive repertoire.
Despite brands being a dominant way in which the business
world conceives of a company’s value and competition strategy, legal
discourse has little to no understanding about these important,
powerful business tools. This flaw has led to the law’s permissive
treatment of brands, with little appreciation for the implications of
those behaviors as they affect the marketplace and competition in
general. Specifically, two areas of the law—trademark and antitrust—
that ought to operate as complementary parts of a coherent system
to regulate competition, are giving corporate mark holders broad
and increasing competitive brand power without either an explicit
public policy debate or a conscious attempt to craft an appropriate
legal regime to manage brands.
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As such, the current debate misses questions about the
appropriate limits, if any, for the near absolute control of brand
image, and the interaction of manufacturers, distributors, and
consumers. Instead, strange doctrines with dubious theoretical
foundations have arisen. For example, in trademark law, odd results
in confusion analysis and recent expansions of trademark law such as
initial interest confusion and dilution grow and upset the balance
between competing producers and between producer and consumer.
In antitrust law, courts analyze questions of market definition,
anticompetitive harm, barriers to entry, and vertical restraints but fail
to see the how a brand, by design, directly affects these issues.
All is not lost, however. Competition law can and must begin to
remedy the situation by simply drawing on the rich literature on
brands and embracing a brand perspective as competition law
confronts the realities of brands and competition. Such a perspective
would allow all involved with competition policy to see more
precisely what is at stake in a given issue.
Brands and competition travel together and will continue to do
so well into the twenty-first century. As one commentator has said,
“the brand is” the “reason, or ‘logos’ of the economy.”374 If legal
systems and legal discourse wish to remain relevant and vibrant as
they address competition, they must understand the brand. Failing
to understand brands will lead to further confusion and dissonance as
the law attempts to manage business realities with incomplete
theoretical models. Understanding brands, however, can only
enhance the way in which brands and the law interact to provide a
coherent, dynamic competitive system.

374. LURY, supra note 32, at 6.
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